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ABSTRACT 
A startup’s path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and 
most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these 
odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees’ incentives 
to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance 
the goal of profitability with another goal—the goal of good—the risks are 
likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are 
threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals 
adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore 
contracting terms specific to impact investing funds and their portfolio 
companies. We observe one possible private ordering mechanism to 
balance and align interests to serve both goals: employee ownership. 
Traditional VC investments confront contracting challenges as the 
portfolio companies and investors balance their interests, which may not 
align. Additionally, portfolio companies are contracting with their own 
employees. The VC contracting literature identifies several agency costs 
that contractual terms can address. Contracts can help attract the right 
employees, then encourage them to work, stay, and share their best ideas. 
But, the existing literature addresses traditional agency costs with respect 
to the pursuit of a single monetary goal. Impact investment funds that 
balance monetary goals, short-term or long, with other goals may strike a 
different balance in negotiating with companies. We examine how the 
introduction of new motivations and interests into a precarious negotiation 
process shapes contracting outcomes. 
We address this question empirically by analyzing the role of 
employee stock ownership in impact investment fund contracts when 
investing in targeted portfolio companies. That a startup’s employees 
might receive shares and options is uncontroversial. Indeed, this appears 
in many ways to be fundamental to today’s startup culture. Might impact 
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investors mandate that employees own shares as a means to balance dual 
goals? That is the key question for our analysis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Employee ownership is a source of corporate governance optimism. 
It can help recruit and retain better employees, and it can neutralize agency 
costs by aligning employees’ and other shareholders’ interests.  
High-profile tech companies like Facebook and Twitter, and fictional ones 
like those depicted in the show Silicon Valley, associate tech employment 
with ownership.1 Outside of the tech world, established, large-scale 
                                                     
* Christopher Geczy, Academic Director, Wharton Wealth Management Initiative, Director of Jacobs 
Levy Equity Management Center for Quantitative Research; Jessica S. Jeffers, Ph.D. candidate, 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; Anne M. Tucker, Associate Professor of Law, Georgia 
State University College of Law; David K. Musto, Ronald O. Perelman Professor in Finance & 
Department Chair, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. David Musto is also an economist at 
the Securities Exchange Commission. The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, 
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views 
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or 
of the authors colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. 
 1. See, e.g., Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 895, 901 (2014) (describing salaries within technology startups and requiring less 
capital than other initial costs because “significant portions of compensation will be through stock 
grants and options”); see also Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1163, 1220 (2013) (describing stock options and grants generally). 
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companies like Whole Foods,2 Starbucks,3 and Chobani4 boast strong 
employee ownership programs. 
Impact investing is a source of optimism about society’s potential 
benefit from profit-seeking firms and investment funds. In the impact 
sector, venture capital (VC) partnerships aim to produce societal benefits 
alongside monetary returns by seeking out portfolio companies dedicated 
to both goals.5 The importance of the nonmonetary goal in impact 
investing raises the question of whether employee ownership plays the 
same role as it does when only profits are sought. We address this question 
in our Article. In reviewing 100 contracts and preliminary contracts, we 
observe a relatively high incidence of employee ownership plans as a deal 
term, a condition, of the joint agreement for the impact fund to invest and 
for the portfolio company to accept the financing. That is, the investors 
appear to not only allow but also require portfolio companies to encourage 
employee share ownership. This finding raises further questions. Are 
employee ownership programs compatible with small-scale companies in 
emerging or developing economies? Can employee ownership programs 
further additional ends in the unique context of impact investment, such as 
fostering social and employee quality of life benefits? Who benefits from 
the creation of employee ownership plans: portfolio companies or impact 
funds? 
In this Article, we examine the intersection of shared employee 
ownership, private equity/venture capitalism, and impact investments. 
Drawing upon a unique data set of impact investment fund survey 
responses and voluntarily supplied documents, we examine shared 
                                                     
 2. About Our Benefits, WHOLE FOODS, http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/careers/about-our-
benefits [https://perma.cc/2JXL-U2GW]. “All of our full-time and part-time team members are 
eligible to receive stock options through annual leadership grants or through service-hour grants once 
they have accumulated 6,000 service hours (approximately three years of full-time employment). 
Approximately 95% of the equity awards granted under the Company’s stock plan since its inception 
in 1992 have been granted to team members who are not executive officers. In fiscal year 2013, more 
than 14,000 team members exercised over 4 million stock options worth approximately $120 million 
in gains before taxes, or an average of about $8,400 per team member.” Form 10-K, WHOLE FOODS, 
https://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/sites/default/files/media/Global/Company%20Info/PDFs/WFM
-2013-10-K.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5TL-LH9Z ] (describing the stock ownership plan). 
 3. 2014 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, Bean Stock: A Program that Turned Employees into 
Partners Continues to Change Lives, STARBUCKS, https://news.starbucks.com/2014annualmeeting/ 
program-that-turned-employees-into-partners [https://perma.cc/MNG9-RLRD]. 
 4. Jena McGregor, How Chobani CEO Ensures That Employees Will Share in the Company’s 
Success, L.A. TIMES (May 1, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-on-leadership-chobani-
20160430-story.html [https://perma.cc/6639-NLX3]; see also Stephanie Strom, At Chobani, Now It’s 
Not Just the Yogurt That’s Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/04/27/business/a-windfall-for-chobani-employees-stakes-in-the-company.html?_r=0. 
 5. ANTHONY BUGG-LEVINE & JED EMERSON, IMPACT INVESTING: TRANSFORMING HOW WE 
MAKE MONEY WHILE MAKING A DIFFERENCE 8 (1st ed. 2011) (describing impact investment funds 
as optimistic and action-oriented). 
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ownership from the point of view of the funds through a contract theory 
lens. 
Within our study, we found that contractual terms, particularly 
regarding employee share ownership, cluster by fund. This clustering 
suggests that, to some extent, funds drive the observed commitment to 
employee ownership. When surveyed, fund managers’ responses suggest 
that employee ownership is compatible with impact investment 
objectives.6 We offer several hypotheses for the motive at the portfolio 
company and fund level to include employee ownership schemes. Through 
extensive cross-sectional analysis, we investigate the various employee 
ownership theories, offer preliminary observations gleaned from our 
sample, and suggest future areas of research in this new field. 
The existing shared ownership literature focuses on employee 
ownership in startups, best practices in implementing employee ownership 
programs, and the benefits of employee ownership plans such as 
recruitment, retention, and performance. The private equity and VC 
literature focuses on mechanisms of contract to structure investment and 
financial incentives at the fund level and the portfolio company level.7 The 
private equity and VC literature, however, is mostly silent on funds 
contracting for shared ownership in portfolio companies.8 The impact 
investment literature, the most nascent of the fields both in terms of 
practice and study, is largely dominated by industry and grant-funded 
research-backed in part by financial intermediaries with impact investment 
products available. Our Article adds to the existing employee ownership 
literature by building out the fund’s perspective and interest in shared 
ownership. It also adds to the existing private equity and VC literature by 
examining shared ownership and to the emerging impact investment 
literature by providing an extensive academic review of a large set of 
contracts in this space. 
Our Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we introduce impact 
investment for those unfamiliar with the topic. In Part II, we provide a 
brief overview of employee ownership structures. In Part III, we state the 
various hypotheses for company and fund preferences for employee 
ownership and introduce predictions for data observations. In Part IV, we 
state our methodology and review our sample. In Part V, we introduce 
survey and document review results. In Part VI, we discuss the limitations 
                                                     
 6. Survey responses on file with authors. 
 7. See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928). 
 8. See, e.g., Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real 
World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUDIES 281 (2003) 
[hereinafter Kaplan & Stomberg, 2003]; Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Characteristics, 
Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses, 59 J. FIN. 2177 (2004) [hereinafter 
Kaplan & Stomberg, 2004]. 
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of our study, share our observations and insights from this study, and 
outline future work. 
I. IMPACT INVESTMENT 
Impact investments—investments made with the intention of 
generating social and environmental impact alongside financial  
gains9—account for more than $77 billion USD.10 While it is only a 
fraction of the more than $200 trillion financial market,11 impact investing 
is a growing investment strategy12 that is attracting major market players 
to the space.13 For example, in 2015, major private equity players—
BlackRock Inc. and Bain Capital LP—launched new impact investment 
funds.14 
Financial industry groups and foundations have significantly 
contributed information about and knowledge of impact investment 
challenges, statistics, and trends.15 Several academic studies of social 
                                                     
 9. CAMBRIDGE ASSOCS. & GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK, INTRODUCING THE IMPACT 
INVESTING BENCHMARK, at i (2015), http://40926u2govf9kuqen1ndit018su-wpengine.netdna-
ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Introducing-the-Impact-Investing-Benchmark.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6XW2-DTGV] [hereinafter GIIN, BENCHMARK]; see also GLOB. IMPACT 
INVESTING NETWORK, IMPACTBASE SNAPSHOT: AN ANALYSIS OF 300+ IMPACT INVESTING FUNDS 7 
(2015), https://thegiin.org/assets/documents/pub/ImpactBaseSnapshot.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TG4-
YTSA]. To qualify as an impact investment, the “intention” for proactive impact must be matched 
with measurable outcomes. SEAN GREENE, A SHORT GUIDE TO IMPACT INVESTING 4, 10 (2015), 
http://casefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Short-Guide-Oct2015-Digital-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9VCW-VSVK]. 
 10. GLOB. IMPACT INVESTING NETWORK RESEARCH TEAM, 2016 ANNUAL IMPACT INVESTOR 
SURVEY 12 (2016), https://thegiin.org/assets/2016%20GIIN%20Annual%20Impact%20Investor 
%20Survey_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/FN55-HY7R] (estimating $77.4 billion USD in impact 
investment assets managed by 156 survey respondents) [hereinafter GIIN, 2016 SURVEY]. A similar 
study conducted in 2015 reported that 146 who responded managed a total of $60 billion USD. 
YASEMIN SALTUK ET AL., EYES ON THE HORIZON: THE IMPACT INVESTOR SURVEY, (2015) 
https://thegiin.org/knowledge/publication/eyes-on-the-horizon [https://perma.cc/EH8F-62NW] 
[hereinafter GIIN, 2015 SURVEY]. 
 11. U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY BD. ON IMPACT INVESTING, PRIVATE CAPITAL PUBLIC GOOD: HOW 
SMART FEDERAL POLICY CAN GALVANIZE IMPACT INVESTING—AND WHY IT’S URGENT 4 (2014), 
http://www.nabimpactinvesting.org/ [https://perma.cc/MD6P-GHX4]. 
 12. MANUEL STAGARS, IMPACT INVESTMENT FUNDS FOR FRONTIER MARKETS IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 8 (2015). 
 13. For example, Zurich Insurance and AXA Group entered the impact investing market in the 
last several years. GIIN, 2016 SURVEY, supra note 10, at 4. 
 14. Id. See also Landon Thomas, Jr., At BlackRock, a Wall Street Rock Star’s $5 Trillion 
Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/business/dealbook/at-
blackrock-shaping-the-shifts-in-power.html  (describing BlackRock as the world’s largest asset 
manager); Michael J. de la Merced, Ex-Governor Will Lead New Fund at Bain Capital, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/business/ex-governor-will-lead-new-fund-at-
bain-capital.html?_r=0 (describing Bain Capital as one of “the biggest and best-known private equity 
firms, with roughly $65 billion in assets under management”). 
 15. See, e.g., GIIN, BENCHMARK, supra note 9 (studying fifty-one impact funds and reporting 
financial returns and descriptive statistics); see also GREENE, supra note 9. 
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enterprise have been published in the last five years,16 but to date few have 
focused specifically on impact investment.17 Our academic study adds to 
the existing body of literature by focusing on impact investment 
contracting norms generally, and in this Article, specifically examining the 
role of and preference for employee ownership. 
Impact investing describes an investment strategy, not an asset 
class.18 Impact investments avoid allocating capital to companies that 
“induce harm for society or the environment.”19 But negative screening, 
alone, is insufficient to qualify an investment as “impact.”20 Impact 
investing focuses on early-stage investing to bring companies with impact 
goals to economic viability and produce blended value.21 Investments 
typically achieve impact or blended value22 through product impact23 or 
operational impact. To illustrate the following, consider a company whose 
intended social benefit is embedded in its product and business model, for 
example a cook stove designed to reduce toxic exhaust in low-income 
households. Alternatively, a company’s impact could lie in its operations 
through higher wages paid to coffee pickers, through distribution of the 
product to the neediest, or through pricing it below top market rates. 
Stringent definitions of impact focus on benefit generated above what the 
                                                     
 16. See, e.g., Robert T. Esposito, Charitable Solicitation Acts: Maslow’s Hammer for Regulating 
Social Enterprise, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 463, 469 (2015) (examining the intersection of charitable 
solicitation acts and social enterprise forms); see also Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law 
Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 771 (2015) (examining social enterprise through new governance 
theory and similar self-regulatory principles). 
 17. Deborah Burand, Resolving Impact Investment Disputes: When Doing Good Goes Bad, 48 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 67–68 (2015) (describing dispute resolution in impact investment); 
Bhagwan Chowdhry et al., Incentivizing Impact Investing (May 19, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2437238 (providing a model theoretical foundation for funding impact 
investments through Social Impact Bonds to discourage over investment, or Social Impact Guarantees 
to discourage under investment); Uli Grabenwarter, The Gamma Model for Impact Measurement in 
Fund Investments (Apr. 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2381129 
(discussing measurement obstacles for impact investments); Karen E. Wilson et al., Social Impact 
Investment: Building the Evidence Base (Feb. 3, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.2139/ssrn.2562082 (proposing a framework for assessing the social impact investment market and 
focusing on the need to build the evidence base). 
 18. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 9. Impact investing has “animated a generation of entrepreneurs 
and captured the imagination of world leaders. It links the social consciousness of philanthropy with 
the market principles of business. It’s about how the power of markets can help to scale solutions to 
some of our most urgent problems.” U.S. NAT’L ADVISORY BD. ON IMPACT INVESTING, supra note 
11, at 4. 
 19. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 9. 
 20. Paul Brest & Kelly Born, Unpacking the Impact in Impact Investing, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. (Aug. 14, 2013), http://ssir.org/articles/entry/unpacking_the_impact_in_impact_ 
investing [https://perma.cc/K4JR-P5GN]. 
 21. BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 5, at 10 (“If impact investing is what we do, blended 
value is what we produce.”). 
 22. GREENE, supra note 9, at 4. 
 23. Brest & Born, supra note 20. 
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market would have otherwise produced, a concept coined additionality.24 
While definitions and practices vary, impact investors generally seek 
business ideas that depart in an important and potentially measurable way 
from practices associated with maximizing profit. Common impact themes 
are job creation and quality, economic development through 
infrastructure, financial inclusion such as microfinance, sustainable living 
through access to healthy and environmentally friendly products, 
agriculture businesses, and education access and outcomes.25 
The provision of capital may, itself, be a benefit if the investment 
provides additional capital or capital at a lower cost than the portfolio 
company could get in the traditional financial market. Capital benefits 
include: (i) price—below market investments, (ii) pledge—loan 
guarantees, (iii) position—subordinated debt or equity positions, (iv) 
patience—longer locked-in terms before exit, (v) purpose—capital 
adaptable to the portfolio company’s needs, and (vi) perspicacity—
discerning opportunities that traditional finance markets overlook.26 
Impact investments also pursue financial returns. The question is 
how much? Impact investments can seek concessionary returns—an 
intentional sacrifice of market-based returns to achieve greater social or 
environmental impact—or nonconcessionary returns attempting to match 
risk-adjusted market rates.27 A 2015 Global Impact Investing Network 
(GIIN) study of fifty-one benchmark impact funds launched between 1998 
and 2004 reported 6.9% returned to investors.28 The same study results, 
when limited to funds under $100 million and launched between 1998 and 
2010, reported a return of 9.5% (IRR) to investors.29 In a 2016 study issued 
by the Wharton Social Impact Initiative affiliated with the University of 
Pennsylvania, three co-authors of this Article reported that impact funds 
seeking market rate returns performed consistent (or nearly consistent) 
                                                     
 24. Additionality increases the quantity or quality of a portfolio company’s social outcomes 
beyond what it could have generated absent the investment. Brest & Born, supra note 20. Not all 
definitions of impact investment require additionality or the notion of but-for causality. See, e.g., 
GREENE, supra note 9, at 39–40. 
 25. GIIN, BENCHMARK, supra note 9, at 3. Other impact sectors include renewable energy and 
climate change, small business finance, and fair trade. 
 26. Brest & Born, supra note 20; see also STAGARS, supra note 12, at 30–32 (describing how 
impact strategies are focusing on undercapitalized places, sectors, and assets). 
 27. Brest & Born, supra note 20. 
 28. GIIN, BENCHMARK, supra note 9, at i, 2 (noting that the funds studied sought to make risk-
adjusted market-rate returns “with target net internal rate of return (IRR) of 15% or higher, and 
mezzanine funds with a target net IRR of 10% or higher”). The Internal Rate of Return (IRR) is the 
discount rate that makes the net present value of an investment equal to zero. The IRR reported in the 
study reflect actual returns to the limited partners, which are net of management fees and carried 
interest. Id. at 9. 
 29. Id. at 14; see also GIIN, 2015 SURVEY, supra note 10, at 32 (describing impact investors’ 
portfolio’s performing mostly in line with expectations). 
2017] In Pursuit of Good & Gold 563 
with benchmark indices demonstrating financial competitiveness, on a 
gross basis, with other equity investments.30 
Impact funds’ social, environmental, and financial gains are achieved 
through investments—venture investing, private equity, and direct 
lending—in mission-aligned portfolio companies. Impact funds typically 
invest in small capitalization markets subject to friction and inefficiencies 
that deter traditional investors. “[T]he most capital-starved countries, 
sectors, and institutions are capital starved for a reason: they are the most 
difficult ones in which to make financially profitable investments.”31 
Limited investment opportunities in emerging economies, especially with 
mission-aligned investments, present challenges such as information 
asymmetries,32 small investment scale,33 difficulty in building a deal 
pipeline,34 and limited exit opportunities, which may deter traditional 
investors.35 
Impact fund investors commonly include private foundations, 
government entities, other financial institutions, and high net-worth 
individuals36 who can satisfy the Regulation D requirements for exempt 
private equity and VC offerings.37 
II. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP PLAN STRUCTURES AND ATTRIBUTES 
Our Article examines the relationship, if any, between impact 
investments and employee ownership. Employee ownership, also called 
shared capitalism in the sociology literature,38 includes stock ownership 
                                                     
 30. JACOB GRAY ET AL., GREAT EXPECTATIONS: MISSION PRESERVATION AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE IN IMPACT INVESTING 5–6 (Wharton Social Impact Initiative, 2016), 
https://socialimpact.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Great-Expectations-Mission-
Preservation-and-Financial-Performance-in-Impact-Investing.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6XM-ZQZW]. 
 31. BUGG-LEVINE & EMERSON, supra note 5, at 31. 
 32. Impact fund managers must acquire knowledge about existing investment opportunities in 
mission-aligned companies and then help those entrepreneurs develop the skills to successfully 
manage a business. Id. at 34, 76. 
 33. Small investments may affect the ability of funds to provide technical assistance, what some 
consider a key component of VC success, to portfolio companies. Id. at 34. 
 34. Id. at 76 (noting the limited investment opportunities). 
 35. Brest & Born, supra note 20. “[T]he goal of a private equity investor is to invest in portfolio 
companies with high growth potential or undervalued assets, work with management to improve 
performance of the business, and exit the investment to realize a significant gain.” Hugh Manahan, 
Private Equity Investments in Microfinance in India, 4 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 293, 
313 (2015). 
 36. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 22–23. 
 37. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 22; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2013) (defining accredited 
investors); 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2013) (Regulation D Exemption for limited offers and sales of 
securities not exceeding $5,000,000); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2013) (Regulation D Exemption for 
limited offers and sales without regard to dollar amount of offering). 
 38. Douglas Kruse et al., Does Shared Capitalism Help the Best Firms Do Even Better? 1  
(May 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 
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plans, stock options, profit sharing, and stock bonus plans owned outright 
or through retirement accounts.39 An estimated 9,000 companies have 
various forms of stock ownership, profit sharing, and stock bonus plans 
affecting40 36% of U.S. employees (approximately 38 million 
Americans).41 
Employee ownership schemes42 vary across three main aspects: 
rights in the stock, access to the stock, and payment for the stock. The first, 
rights in the stock, describes whether the employee owns the stock 
outright—a grant—or whether the employee holds the right to purchase 
company stock at a future date—an option.43 Access to the stock and the 
payment schemes are closely related and describe how the employee 
obtains the company stock—as a bonus, as a profit sharing plan, through 
a defined contribution plan (401k) as a retirement investment option, 
through an employee purchase plan, or as a traditional employee stock 
ownership plan (ESOP)—as well as whether the employee, a portion of 
the employee’s salary, or the company “pays” for the stock.44 Companies 
                                                     
10.1.1.365.4399&rep=rep1&type=pdf; see also JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., THE CITIZEN’S SHARE: 
PUTTING OWNERSHIP BACK INTO DEMOCRACY (2013); MICHAEL QUARREY ET AL., TAKING STOCK: 
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP AT WORK (1986). 
 39. ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan) Facts, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, 
http://www.esop.org [https://perma.cc/2Z6P-L6BF]; see also JACK VANDERHEI ET AL., 401(K) PLAN 
ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 2014, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF # 423, 
at 31 (2016), https://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_423.Apr16.401k-Update.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4GZV-WU8H] [hereinafter EBRI REPORT]. 
 40. In 2014, the General Social Survey was repeated through the National Opinion Research 
Center. The analysis and questions were designed by Douglas Kruse and Joseph Blasi of Rutgers 
University and Richard Freeman of Harvard University for the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) Shared Capitalism Project. The General Social Survey sample size was 885 working adults 
who were asked very specific questions about their participation in these plans. Data Show Widespread 
Employee Ownership in U.S., NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/ 
widespread-employee-ownership-us [https://perma.cc/4JR6-PWLB]. 
 41. This estimate excludes government employers, nonprofits, partnerships, etc. See A Statistical 
Profile of Employee Ownership, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP (Dec. 2015), 
https://www.nceo.org/articles/statistical-profile-employee-ownership [https://perma.cc/HU46BLE5]. 
 42. Louis Kelso and M. Adler introduced the modern employee ownership concepts in the 1950s. 
LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958). They argued that 
capital, not labor, was the primary source of industrial wealth and that technology, as a form of capital, 
was the linchpin to economic productivity. They argued that survival of the capitalist economy 
depended upon sharing capital ownership with labor as a means to redistribute wealth and prevent 
unsustainable pay gaps. Id. at 28–29, 39–41, 171–72. For a brief and compelling history of Louis 
Kelso and the birth of the modern ESOP, see Andrew W. Stumpff, Fifty Years of Utopia: A  
Half-Century After Louis Kelso’s the Capitalist Manifesto, A Look Back at the Weird History of the 
ESOP, 62 TAX LAW. 419 (2009). 
 43. Stock Options, Restricted Stock, Phantom Stock, Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs), and 
Employee Stock Purchase Plans (ESPPs), NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/ 
articles/stock-options-restricted-phantom-sars-espps [https://perma.cc/E4DJ-E9G4]. 
 44. See, e.g., How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. 
OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/esop-employee-stock-ownership-plan [https://perma.cc/ 
JWU9-2ADA]. 
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also shape the reach of employee owners’ voting rights as full, restricted, 
or subject to statutory minimums.45 
Employee ownership is a robust field in the study of law and subject 
to its own rich debate regarding purpose,46 appropriate structure,47 and 
policy implications.48 For purposes of this Article, we highlight the main 
structural components of common employee stock plans through which 
employees obtain company stock and become employee owners. The 
various structures matter immensely with regard to legal oversight, 
administration, accounting, and tax.49 For our Article’s discussion, we 
treat all of these plans equally as paths to shared employee ownership.50 
                                                     
 45. Aditi Bagchi, Varieties of Employee Ownership: Some Unintended Consequences of 
Corporate Law and Labor Law, 10 U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 305, 308–14 (2008). 
 46. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, 
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1770 (1990) (describing potential 
benefits of worker ownership as “worker ownership promises some conspicuous efficiency advantages 
over investor ownership, including improved worker productivity, avoidance of the problems of 
opportunism associated with worker lock-in, less strategic behavior in bargaining, better 
communication of worker preferences, improved monitoring of management, and the further 
satisfactions that may arise from participation in the process of collective decision-making”); see also 
Justin Schwartz, Where Did Mill Go Wrong?: Why the Capital-Managed Firm Rather Than the  
Labor-Managed Enterprise Is the Predominant Organizational Form in Market Economies, 73 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 219 (2012) (proposing a theory why employee ownership is not more widespread given the 
benefits of such structures). 
 47. See, e.g., Corey Rosen et al., Every Employee an Owner. Really., HARV. BUS. REV., June 
2005, https://hbr.org/2005/06/every-employee-an-owner-really [https://perma.cc/6G9V-3QPH] 
(arguing for widespread employee participation in ESOPs and other structural features of ownership 
plans such as participation and communication). 
 48. See, e.g., Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 103 (1986) (arguing that ESOPs do not deliver the non-tax benefits claimed by 
proponents, and cause inefficient market distortions, particularly on the market for corporate control); 
see also Elana Ruth Hollo, The Quiet Revolution: Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Their 
Influence on Corporate Governance, Labor Unions, and Future American Policy, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 
561, 594 (1992) (reviewing the policy goals and performance of employee ownership programs and 
concluding that “[t]he primary beneficiaries of ESOP tax subsidies appear to be the corporations which 
use ESOPs as takeover defenses or for other purposes”). 
 49. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. OWNERSHIP, THE ESOP READER: A PRIMER ON EMPLOYEE 
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPS) 1, 4 (Scott Rodrick & Corey Rosen, eds., 2003) (discussing tax, 
accounting, and finance benefits for participating companies). 
 50. We separate out the question of why grant employees ownerships rights in firms from the 
question of how to do it, addressing the former, not the later in this Article. Bifurcating the questions 
leaves a significant piece of the puzzle on the sidelines, but is necessary for this Article. First, our 
small sample size of impact investment funds and responsive employee ownership contract provisions, 
as discussed infra at pages 22–28, prevents us from separately examining the question of why. Second, 
the firms in which the employees will receive ownership rights are located in different jurisdictions, 
which prevents a meaningful analysis of the how question under the current U.S. legal system, 
particularly as it relates to deferred compensation plans. 
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A. Employee Stock Option Plans 
Stock option plans are contractual agreements between the company 
and the employees giving employees the right to buy a set number of 
company shares at a fixed price51 within a certain period of time after the 
grant (exercise window or vesting period).52 To exercise the right, the 
holder of the option must tender the exercise price.53 In other words, stock 
options give employees the right to purchase stock, with their own money 
in the future and subject to additional conditions, usually continued 
employment and a lapse of time.54 
Employee stock option plans compensate employees when 
employees exercise the option to purchase stock and their fixed price is 
less than the current trading price or value of the stock.55 Subject to 
Internal Revenue Code Section 83(a), nonqualified stock option plans 
defer taxation until the time the holder exercises the option, not at the time 
of the grant.56 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires 
registration of stock options with publicly traded companies and offers an 
exemption under Section 70157 for private companies with a written 
benefit plan or contract with the employee.58 
1. Nonqualified Employee Stock Option Plans 
Nonqualified plans, also called nonstatutory plans, are largely 
matters of private agreement and are subject to few formation 
requirements.59 Participation in nonqualified plans is often concentrated 
                                                     
 51. The strike price of the option can be set below, at, or above the market price, exchange price 
of publicly traded stock, or fair market value in private company stock. These three pricing options 
are called in, at, or out of the money, respectively. Matthew A. Melon, Are Compensatory Stock 
Options Worth Reforming?, 38 GONZ. L. REV. 535, 539 (2003). 
 52. Employee Stock Options Plans, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/ 
empopt.htm [https://perma.cc/6SUD-EF98]. Companies generally use Form S-8 to register the 
securities being offered under the plan. Id. For a discussion of employee ownership structures, see for 
example Matthew T. Bodie, Aligning Incentives with Equity: Employee Stock Options and Rule  
10B-5, 88 IOWA L. REV. 539, 549 (2003). 
 53. Melon, supra note 51, at 540. 
 54. “Employee ownership may create some property rights in the individual that are realized 
only after the employee has achieved a long tenure or even retirement.” Bagchi, supra note 45, at 308. 
 55. See Mark S. Rhodes, Transfer of Stock § 4:6, in 12 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS § 5460.20 (7th ed. Apr. 2016) (discussing how stock options compliment 
compensation packages and common contractual terms); see Employee Stock Options Plans, supra 
note 52. 
 56. I.R.C. § 83 (2016); Melon, supra note 51, at 542–43. 
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (2016). 
 58. Robert B. Robbins, Securities Offerings to Employees, Consultants and Advisors Under Rule 
701, CX019 A.L.I. CLE 343, § I (2016). 
 59. See, e.g., Tax Topics: Topic 427—Stock Options, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/taxtopics/ 
tc427.html [https://perma.cc/9X4H-EN6N]; see also Joe Wallin, Incentive Stock Options vs. 
Nonqualified Stock Options, STARTUP L. BLOG (May 15, 2013), http://www.startuplawblog.com/ 
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among upper management60 in contrast to the qualified plans, discussed 
below. Firms can also extend participation to non-employee directors and 
independent contractors, in contrast to qualified plans. 
Nonqualified option plans are strongly associated with startup 
companies, especially in the tech industry. Stock options are one way a 
cash-strapped company in an early development stage can attract and 
retain talented employees while deferring their compensation and linking 
it to the success of the company.61 
2. Qualified Employee Stock Option Plans 
Qualified plans retain the key features of stock options—employees 
use individual funds to purchase stock in the future subject to certain 
conditions—and add formation requirements, participation limits, and 
prohibitions against discrimination among different types of employees.62 
The nondiscrimination requirements result in broad grants in which a large 
percentage of employees participate, rather than concentrating the option 
in upper management. 
Qualified stock option plans may be classified as an “incentive stock 
option”63 and receive certain federal tax benefits.64 The difference between 
the stock option exercise price and the fair market value on the exercise 
date—the compensation—is not taxed under qualified plans, and taxation 
is deferred until the employee disposes of the plan stock.65 Qualifying 
requirements include that the option price reflect fair market value with a 
ten-year expiration date and subject to a $100,000 annual cap.66 A second 
form of qualified plans—“Employee stock purchase plans”67—receive 
similar tax benefits by excluding gains. Qualification requirements include 
                                                     
2013/05/15/incentive-stock-options-vs-nonqualified-stock-options/ [https://perma.cc/S987-NSP8] 
(comparing the two different types of stock option plans). 
 60. Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, The Political Economy of Employee Ownership in the 
United States: From Economic Democracy to Industrial Democracy?, 16 INT’L REV. SOC. 127, 140 
(2006). 
 61. Thomas A. Smith, The Zynga Clawback: Shoring Up the Central Pillar of Innovation, 53 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 577, 584 (2013) (discussing the role of stock option contracting and 
compensation in entrepreneur/startup firms). 
 62. IRS, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPS), INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, 
§ 4.72.4 (Aug. 18, 2016) https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-072-004.html [https://perma.cc/ 
Y7R6-49FK]. 
 63. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2016); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.422-1 (2016). 
 64. Bodie, supra note 52, at 547, 548. 
 65. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2016); see also Merlo v. C.I.R., 492 F.3d 618, 621 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(describing the tax benefits of qualified plans); Melon, supra note 51, at 546. 
 66. 26 U.S.C. § 422 (2016); see also Bodie, supra note 52, at 547–48 (describing the 
qualification requirements for incentive plans under Section 422). 
 67. 26 U.S.C. § 423 (2014); see also 26 C.F.R. § 1.423-2 (2009). 
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fair market pricing, expiration dates, and broad grants to all full-time 
employees with two years or more tenure at the company.68 
B. Stock Grants 
1. Nonqualified Stock Programs 
Stock grants, unlike options, give the holder the stock immediately 
or nearly immediately, and usually as a performance incentive.69 These 
plans can be referred to as restricted stock plans because receiving the 
stock is contingent upon certain future events such as an employment 
anniversary or performance benchmarks.70 When the benchmarks are 
achieved, the promised stock vests with the employee.71 The employee 
now owns the stock. Restricted stock programs are a part of a 
compensation package and can be used, as with all forms of employee 
ownership, as a recruitment, retention, and alignment tool.72 Restricted 
stock program participation is concentrated in upper management and 
senior level employees.73 
2. Tax-Qualified Stock Programs—Retirement Plans 
Tax-qualified defined contribution plans also distribute company 
ownership through stock to employers. The most common form of 
employee ownership in the U.S. is the employee stock ownership plan 
(ESOP).74 
As a regulated defined contribution plan, ESOPs were created under 
the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)75 and are subject 
to oversight through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),76 the Department 
                                                     
 68. 26 U.S.C. § 423 (2014). 
 69. See, e.g., Sam Shah, A Look at Equity Compensation in 2004, 19 J. COMP. & BENEFITS, no. 
4, July–Aug. 2003.  
 70. Gordon Klepper, Restricted Stock Units: The Practical Alternative in Equity Compensation 
for the U.S. Multi-national Employer, 20 J. COMP. & BENEFITS, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 14 
(Restricted stock programs are contractual rights for an employee to achieve stock “at a scheduled 
future time or times, subject to the employee meeting certain employment-related conditions. The 
conditions typically require the employee’s continued employment, and also may include obligations 
not to compete with the employer, release confidential information, or engage in other misconduct.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. H. Stephen Grace Jr. & John E. Haupert, Governance Lessons from the Disney Litigation, 
BUS. L. TODAY 1, 1–2 (2011). 
 73. See, e.g., Meredith R. Conway, Money for Nothing and the Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive 
Compensation, 17 CORN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 383, 406 (2008) (describing Enron’s restricted stock 
program available to upper management). 
 74. How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, supra note 44. 
 75. Id. 
 76. “[E]mployee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is an individually designed stock bonus plan, 
which is qualified under Internal Revenue Code Section 401(a) . . . designed to invest primarily in 
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of Labor,77 and the SEC.78 Companies sponsoring ESOPs79 contribute 
stock (or money to buy stock) to the plan in order to benefit the company’s 
employees. ESOPs must invest primarily80 in “qualifying employer 
securities,” offer pass-through voting to participants, permit 
diversification as participants approach retirement, and avoid 
discrimination in favor of highly compensated employees.81 
Employers commonly structure ESOPs as stock bonus plans82 or as 
a part of profit-sharing plans.83 ESOPs may comprise the sole retirement 
benefit or it may be a part of another plan, such as a 401(k).84 Each 
participating employee has an account in the ESOP that holds the vested 
stock on behalf of the employee.85 Under ERISA-governed ESOPs, 
workers receive stock grants without utilizing individualized cash savings 
to purchase the shares, thus overcoming an obstacle to employee 
                                                     
qualifying employer securities . . . .ESOPs are subject to the distribution provisions of IRC Section 
401(a)(14), but must also comply with the distribution and payment requirements of IRC Section 
409(o).” Employee Stock Ownership Plans Determination Letter Application Review Process, IRS, 
https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Employee-Stock-Ownership-Plans-Determination-Letter-
Application-Review-Process [https://perma.cc/9WNH-GMFW]. 
 77. The Department of Labor has investigative and enforcement authority under Sections 504 
and 506 of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, that authority was delegated to 
the Employee Benefit Security Administration subject to Secretary’s Order 01-2003, Delegation of 
Authority and Assignment of Responsibilities to the Employee Benefits Security Administration signed 
by Secretary Elaine Chao on January 23, 2003. Delegation of Authority and Assignment of 
Responsibilities to the Employee Benefits Security Administration, 68 Fed. Reg. 5374 (Feb 3, 2003). 
 78. Employee Stock Ownership Plans, supra note 52.  
 79. For a general discussion of ESOP requirements, regulations and components, see Rob 
Brown, Brian Hector & Scott Stitt, Overview of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 31 J. COMP. & 
BENEFITS no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2015. 
 80. Employers satisfy the “primarily” requirement if more than 50% of the plan’s assets are 
invested in stock. See EBSA Report of the Working Group on Employer Assets in ERISA  
Employer-Sponsored Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Nov. 13, 1997), https://www.dol.gov/ebsa/ 
publications/acemer.htm? (quoting the testimony of Neil M. Grossman, Vice President: Legal and 
Regulatory Affairs, Association of Private Pension and Welfare Plans). 
 81. David M. Cantor & Gina M. Marsala, The Role of Company Stock in a Defined Contribution 
Plan, 20 J. COMP. & BENEFITS, no. 6, Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 9. 
 82. 26 U.S.C. § 401 (2014); DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE 
BENEFIT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 24 (2010) (“Stock bonus plans are profit-sharing plans under which 
contributions made in employer stock or, if made in cash, are then invested, wholly or partly, in 
employer stock.”). 
 83. Cantor & Marsala, supra note 81. 
 84. ESOPs must be either a qualified stock bonus plan or a combination of qualified stock bonus 
plan and money purchase pension plan. PRATT & REECE, supra note 82, at 24. Profit sharing plans 
give participating employers funding flexibility depending upon profit and tax benefits whereas money 
purchase pension plans require a minimum annual contribution on behalf of the employer sponsor. Id. 
at 21–26. 
 85. Employee Stock Options Plans, supra note 52. 
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ownership: lack of capital to purchase stock.86 “ESOPs are most 
commonly used to provide a market for the shares of departing owners of 
successful closely held companies, to motivate and reward employees, or 
to take advantage of incentives to borrow money for acquiring new assets 
in pretax dollars.”87 
Additionally, companies may list their stock as one of many 
investment options in the defined contribution plan menu. Under this 
approach, employees use earmarked retirement savings to purchase 
company stock through their defined contribution retirement plan, like a 
401(k).88 This is a widespread practice and a common means by which 
U.S. employees acquire employer stock. “Thirty-three percent (or 8.1 
million) of the 401(k) participants in the 2014 EBRI/ICI 401(k) database 
were in plans that offered company stock as an investment option.”89 
The following chart depicts the structural differences described 
above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. THEORIES OF EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 
Researchers from different backgrounds have studied companies’ 
motivations to offer employees ownership incentives. Theories supporting 
employee ownership are integrated in policy discussions regarding tax, 
employee benefit plans, and worker equality. We summarize the literature 
and policy debates in the following discussion, along with empirical 
predictions for the three main theories discussed in the existing literature. 
                                                     
 86. See Joseph R. Blasi & Douglas L. Kruse, The Political Economy of Employee Ownership in 
the United States: From Economic Democracy to Industrial Democracy?, 16 INT’L REV. SOC. 127, 
128 (2006). 
 87. How an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) Works, supra note 44. 
 88. Blasi & Kruse, supra note 86, at 138. 
 89. EBRI REPORT, supra note 39, at 31. Employees allocated approximately 7% of  
ERISA-governed defined contribution plans assets to company stock, a number that researchers 
documented as declining since its high-water mark of 19% in 1999. Id. at 1. 
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We then propose a new set of motivations for the inclusion of employee 
ownership policies at the fund level, and suggest empirical predictions for 
these theories as well. These predictions form the basis of our results 
discussion in Section VI. 
A. Existing Theories Centered on Portfolio Company Preferences 
1. Aligning the Interests of Company Managers and Employees 
Explanations for shared ownership plans have traditionally focused 
on what may motivate companies to implement such plans. A popular 
justification is that giving employees a stake in the company aligns their 
incentives with the firm, resolving frictions such as agency problems90 that 
might lead employees91 to be less productive than they could be.92 In 
testing this interest-alignment theory, studies overall have found improved 
workplace performance for firms with shared capitalism plans,93 but noted 
that positive effects are observed most strongly when combined with 
policies such as low supervision, employee participation in  
decision-making, and competitive pay94—and with per-employee growth 
options95 and innovation.96 Others, however, argue that employee 
ownership is too expensive relative to incentive gains on their own to 
justify this approach.97 A twist on the incentive alignment hypothesis is 
                                                     
 90. An agency problem occurs when an agent (e.g., employee) has different incentives than the 
principal (e.g., manager) who hired her to do a task. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. 
FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
 91. See Clifford W. Smith, Jr., On the Market for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
259, 261 (1999) (discussing agency problems and noting that employees “have fewer incentives to use 
company resources [more] efficiently than owners”). 
 92. “Chobani’s workers adopt the habits of business owners: being highly productive; engaging 
in less friction between front-line workers and management; self-policing each other to reduce waste 
and errors; and offering up many helpful ideas.” Mary Josephs, What Does Chobani’s Founder Get 
for Giving 10% of His Company to Workers?, FORBES (Apr. 29, 2016, 4:33 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/maryjosephs/2016/04/29/what-does-chobanis-founder-get-for-giving-
10-of-his-company-to-workers/#176165e831de. 
 93. Kruse, supra note 38, at 4–5 (summarizing more than ten studies on organization 
performance under shared capitalism policies and concluding that the correlation is overwhelmingly 
positive). 
 94. Id. at 6. 
 95. Yael V. Hochberg & Laura Lindsey, Incentives, Targeting, and Firm Performance: An 
Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options, 23 J. FIN. STUD. 4148, 4182 (2010). 
 96. Xin Chang et al., Non-Executive Employee Stock Options and Corporate Innovation, 115 J. 
FIN. ECON. 168, 180 (2015) (“[T]he positive relation between employee options and innovation is 
more pronounced in firms with higher employee treatment index or higher R&D per employee, 
confirming our conjecture that the positive effect of employee stock options on innovation productivity 
is stronger if employee inputs are more important and valued.”). 
 97. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees: An 
Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 100–01, 107–08 (2005). 
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that employee ownership plans increase the incentive of employees to 
“swing for the fences” (i.e., take more risk) because of the asymmetry of 
the upside gain relative to the downside loss.98 
Aligning Interests Prediction. If, consistent with the assumptions of 
economic literature, portfolio companies are driving inclusion of 
employee ownership provisions in our sample, we would expect to observe 
common features or clustering among those portfolio companies. For 
example, portfolio companies that propose employee ownership 
provisions should exhibit similar characteristics such as heavy reliance on 
employees for production or high potential for conflicts of interests 
between employees and owners. We may also expect employee ownership 
companies to be similar in size, as measured by the number of employees 
and the stage of company development. 
2. Sorting Employees 
Another prevalent theory of employee ownership plans is that they 
serve as a sorting mechanism by attracting employees who value a firm’s 
option grant most highly.99 This differs from the incentive alignment view 
in that it does not assume that employees will act differently, only that 
they have a different view of the company from the outset. Especially 
within the technology industry, some argue that these plans “help recruit 
[talent] in a company’s early days for in-demand workers.”100 Another 
way of framing this is that equity or options may be a means of providing 
value to employees without having to use cash.101 Indeed, empirical 
evidence suggests equity-based compensation plans are particularly 
popular with firms facing financial needs and constraints.102 
                                                     
 98. See Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, Swinging for the Fences: Executive Reactions to 
Quasi-Random Option Grants 1, 30–32 (Nov. 30, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that on 
average, “moderate increases in options lead to increased firm equity volatility”). 
 99. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 97, at 131 (study demonstrating that “if workers are sufficiently 
optimistic about their employers’ prospects, stock options can be an efficient means of 
compensation”); see also Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, Employee Sentiment and Stock Option 
Compensation, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 671 (2007) (finding that “[o]ption compensation for  
non-executive employees is most common among firms with excellent prior stock price 
performance”). 
 100. Strom, supra note 4. 
 101. Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors’ Responsibilities 
Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
1451, 1486 (1990) (“[I]t is apparent that Congress established leveraged ESOPs in order to address 
perceived inequities in the distribution of capital throughout the economy.”). 
 102. John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees, 61 J. 
FIN. ECON. 253, 255 (2001); see also John R.M. Hand, Give Everyone A Prize? Employee Stock 
Options in Private Venture-Backed Firms, 23 J. BUS. VENTURING 385, 398 (2008); Christopher D. 
Ittner et al., The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New 
Economy Firms, 34 J. ACCT. & ECON. 89, 92 (2003). 
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Sorting Employees Prediction. Similar to the interest-alignment 
prediction, this hypothesis predicts shared characteristics among employee 
ownership firms. If portfolio companies utilize employee ownership plans 
to sort potential employees and identify those who are optimistic about the 
company’s future prospects, these plans will be more prevalent when they 
make more of a difference in sorting. For example, ownership in an  
early-stage firm is riskier than ownership in a late-stage firm, so it is likely 
a more effective sorting tool in early-stage firms. As a result, the  
employee-sorting theory predicts that employee ownership firms should 
share common features such as size, industry, geographic focus, or 
development phase. 
3. Retaining Employees 
In addition to attracting the right employees, shared ownership plans 
may help firms retain employees by making it costly for them to leave in 
bad times when shares of the company are worth less.103 This is especially 
true where stock prices and labor market conditions are positively 
correlated, because it allows employees’ deferred compensation to vary 
along with their outside opportunities.104 Indeed, evidence suggests that 
employee ownership is associated with greater employment stability.105 
Employee Retention Prediction. If portfolio companies pursue 
employee ownership plans to retain talented employees, especially in the 
face of employee uncertainty or salary competition pressures, those 
companies should exhibit commonalities such as high turnover risk. To 
the extent that turnover risk is difficult to observe in this or other samples, 
portfolio companies facing high turnover risk should have identifiable 
                                                     
 103. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 97, at 100, 110 (exploring a relationship between labor market 
conditions in a given industry and a positive correlation with firms’ share prices and hypothesizing 
that “then options [should] serve to index deferred compensation to employees’ outside 
opportunities”); see also id. at 123–25 (developing a model to test the options hypothesis). 
 104. Serdar Aldatmaz et al., The Option to Quit: Employee Stock Options on Turnover 18–19 
(Jan. 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1787169; 
see also Simi Kedia & Shiva Rajgopal, Neighborhood Matters: The Impact of Location on Broad 
Based Stock Option Plans, 92 J. FIN. ECON. 109, 115 (2009) (positing that “local labor markets affect 
a firm’s option grants in four ways: (i) tight labor markets; (ii) Oyer’s (2004) wage indexation theory; 
(iii) enforceability of non-compete agreements; and (iv) employee sentiment that favors stock 
options”) (citing to Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects, 59 J. 
FIN. ECON. 1619 (2004)). 
 105. Research Evidence on Prevalence and Effects of Employee Ownership 2002: Hearing 
before the House Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on Education and the 
Workforce, 107th Cong. (Feb. 13, 2002) (statement of Dr. Douglas Kruse Ph.D.), 
https://www.nceo.org/articles/research-prevalence-effects-employee-ownership [https://perma.cc/ 
7ZWF-L7ED] (citing to JOSEPH BLASI ET AL., STOCK OPTIONS, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE (2000)) [hereinafter Kruse Testimony]. 
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commonalities such as the industry in which they operate, noncompete 
enforceability, age of the workforce, and local unemployment. 
4. Other Explanations 
Shared ownership may also be a way to address social inequality 
within the firm by reducing the gap between management and employees, 
both financially and socially.106 However, this may come at the cost of 
increased risk for workers.107Additional explanations108 for the popularity 
of equity-based compensation include, favorable accounting treatment,109 
though employees still need to value the equity highly enough for this to 
work;110 peer effects;111 and protection in cases of change of control.112 
B. New Theories Centered on Fund Preferences 
Employee ownership schemes are widely acknowledged in  
industry-based venture capital and private equity materials, including 
discussion of valuation, the upsides (for entrepreneurs), the downsides (for 
investors), and administration tips.113 Portfolio companies—startups—are 
assumed to want employee ownership programs, and investors are 
presumed to be resistant. Relevant academic literature documenting 
                                                     
 106. Ittner et al., supra note 102, at 92; Strom, supra note 4; see also Hand, supra note 102, at 
398. 
 107. “Employee ownership may have positive effects if employees value ownership in itself or 
perceive that it brings greater income, job security, or control over jobs and the workplace. On the 
other hand, it may have negligible or even negative effects if employees perceive no difference in their 
work lives, dislike the extra risk to their income or wealth, or have raised expectations that are not 
fulfilled.” Kruse Testimony, supra note 105. 
 108. These hypotheses are beyond the scope of our project, but included in this discussion for 
purposes of introducing readers to the existing literature. 
 109. See generally ESOP Tax Incentives and Contribution Limits, NAT’L CTR. FOR EMP. 
OWNERSHIP, https://www.nceo.org/articles/esop-tax-incentives-contribution-limits [https://perma.cc/ 
AA7C-RKN4]; Core & Guay, supra note 102, at 255 (Employers can deduct contributions to the 
ESOP as well as dividends and rollovers; employees pay no tax on ESOP participation until 
distributions). 
 110. Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 97, at 112 (discounting the accounting advantages of employee 
ownership and arguing that firms incur “real costs of about $3,000 per middle manager per year in 
order to increase reported pre-tax income by about $9,000”). 
 111. Kedia & Rajgopal, supra note 104, at 109, 122 (investigating and demonstrating the social 
influence of option granting by showing that “option grants are increasing with the average broad 
based option grants of other firms located in the MSA”). 
 112. Gavis, supra note 101, at 1489 (“ESOPs . . . may play a significant role in providing 
employees with protection against risks associated with hostile takeovers.”). 
 113. See, e.g., ACCION, Startup Employees Stock Options Plans (ESOPs) Overview and Best 
Practices, http://docplayer.net/7672111-Startup-employee-stock-options-plans-esops-overview-and-
best-practices.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2016) (describing stock options in startup companies); see 
also Richard Harroch, How Employee Stock Options Work in Startup Companies, FORBES (Feb. 27, 
2016, 10:32 AM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/allbusiness/2016/02/27/how-employee-stock-options-
work-in-startup-companies/#5a435d2013ce. 
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venture capital and private equity terms and trends, however, is silent on 
employee ownership provisions from the perspective of investing funds.114 
Our Article bridges the gap between industry and academia, and 
between the portfolio company and the fund perspectives on employee 
ownership schemes. In our sample, we observe a clustering of shared 
ownership-friendly provisions at the fund level—rather than by company 
size or industry. This leads us to question whether funds themselves are 
exerting pressure on portfolio companies to adopt shared ownership plans, 
or at least are more permissive of shared ownership requests by portfolio 
companies than industry literature would suggest. Below, we propose five 
hypotheses broken into two categories: financial motivations and impact 
motivations. We offer alternative predictions based upon the assumption 
that employee ownership is not a costless proposition.115 
If employee ownership provisions are clustered in a fund that invests 
in diverse types of companies without observable commonalities among 
the portfolio companies, then it is likely that the funds, rather than the 
companies, are pursuing employee ownership schemes. Because diverse 
portfolio companies are unlikely to face the same employee  
challenges—aligning incentives, sorting, and retaining talent—diverse 
portfolio companies are likely to generate noisy results within and between 
the funds if there is no other explanation for the inclusion of employee 
ownership schemes. For example, we would expect to see employee 
ownership provisions distributed throughout the funds and fund families 
without a discernable pattern. If, however, funds are pursuing the 
employee ownership provisions, we would expect to see employee 
ownership provisions clustered within funds. 
1. Financial Motivations 
a) “Rolling Up” Company Preferences 
First, it may be that funds view shared ownership plans as a financial 
best practice for companies, for any of the reasons listed in the previous 
section. Funds, as shareholders in the portfolio companies, may adopt the 
preferences traditionally attributed to portfolio companies (aligning 
interests, sorting, retention, accounting, etc.) in pursuing employee 
                                                     
 114. See Steven Freeman, Effects of ESOP Adoption and Employee Ownership: Thirty Years of 
Research and Experience, 4–5 (U. Pa. Organizational Dynamics Working Paper No. 07–01, 2007), 
http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=od_working_papers [https:// 
perma.cc/ME39-NLTF]. 
 115. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Firms, 
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1749, 1771–77, 1779 (1990) (describing 
capital and governance costs associated with worker ownership plans as compared to investor 
ownership organizations). 
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ownership programs. We call this the roll up hypothesis. Funds may act 
according to the roll up hypothesis if the portfolio companies lack the 
sophistication to negotiate for these provisions on their own behalf. As a 
result, they encourage portfolio companies to adopt employee ownership 
plans to maximize firm productivity and ultimately their own profit. 
Roll Up Prediction. It will be difficult to directly observe funds’ 
preference for employee ownership schemes consistent with the  
roll up hypothesis—the desire to implement interest-aligning and  
employee-sorting and retention best practices as a means of protecting the 
fund’s investment in the portfolio company. If funds encourage or allow 
portfolio company ESOPs because they are acting in their best interests as 
shareholders in the portfolio company, then we would expect to observe 
other shareholder protective measures such as strong financial and 
governance contracting terms that traditionally protect investors’ financial 
interests in portfolio companies. 
b) Deflating Effective Price Per Share 
There has also been recent anecdotal evidence116 of funds using 
employee option pools as a way of decreasing the price per share of a 
prospective portfolio company. The scheme, sometimes called an “option 
shuffle,” works like this: funds agree to a pre-money valuation of a 
portfolio company, but (sometimes without the entrepreneur realizing) this 
pre-money valuation includes a substantial pool of new options issued out 
of the pre-money capitalization and set aside for future option 
compensation. This effectively dilutes the entrepreneur (in a Series A) or 
other pre-investment owners (in later funding).117 
To illustrate the impact of an option pool on pricing, consider an 
investment offer of $2 million into a company with an $8 million  
pre-money valuation and 6 million shares. Under the $8 million valuation, 
each share price is $1.33/share. If the investment contract contains 
language that the pre-money valuation includes an unallocated option pool 
equal to 20% of the post-financing, fully diluted capitalization, the 20% of 
$10 million post-financing capitalization creates $2 million in new options 
and reduces the founders’ stake to 6 million shares in a 10 million share 
company or 60% of the post-financing valuation. In this regard, the 
effective pre-money valuation of the company is $6 million and the price 
per share is $1. 
Option Shuffle Prediction. If funds prefer employee ownership 
schemes as a means to discount the per-share price paid by the fund to 
                                                     
 116. See The Option Pool Shuffle, VENTUREHACKS (Apr. 10, 2007), http://venturehacks.com/ 
articles/option-pool-shuffle [https://perma.cc/2PLU-XSNW]. 
 117. Id. 
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enhance the fund’s financial position, then the employee ownership 
language in the term sheets and investment agreements should create the 
employee stock option pool based upon a pre-money capitalization. We 
would similarly expect these funds to seek market rate returns, rather than 
concessionary financial returns, and have strong finance contracting terms. 
2. Impact Motivations 
a) Agency Costs 
Traditional funds have a single goal: maximize financial returns. 
Impact funds118 balance two goals: financial profits and social or 
environmental impact. In pursuit of the latter, impact funds invest in 
benefit-oriented companies through which they pursue financial gains. 
Investors and portfolio company founders may agree or differ on what the 
ideal balance between these goals should be. Investors could try to impose 
their preferred balance through traditional contracting terms, but the 
absence of contracting norms, the relative infancy of the field, and the 
highly individualized needs of each portfolio company may render 
traditional contracting solutions impotent. Investors seeking the ideal 
balance between good and gold may, as a result, be more likely to rely on 
other contracting tools such as employee ownership to indirectly manage 
employees’ incentives. 
Agency Costs Prediction. If funds prefer employee ownership 
schemes as a means of neutralizing expanding agency costs in a 
finance/benefit goal binary by encouraging employees to balance the dual 
goals, then funds may similarly contract for a balance of terms that protect 
both financial and nonpecuniary gains. For example, funds could also 
protect their preferred balance of goals by making cash flow contingent on 
meeting pre-set financial and impact goals. Alternatively, the parties may 
not be capable of directly contracting to impose the fund’s preferred 
balance and instead must rely upon indirect measures like shared 
ownership. 
b) Mission Lock 
Impact funds may also encourage the companies in their portfolio to 
share ownership with their employees (at least partially) as an alternative 
way of locking in mission. Early employees are often most wedded to the 
initial vision of the company.119 If the workforce is fairly stable, employee 
                                                     
 118. Note that here we are talking about market rate-seeking impact funds. 
 119. William A. Brown & Carlton F. Yoshioka, Mission Attachment and Satisfaction as Factors 
in Employee Retention, 14 NONPROFIT MGMT & LEADERSHIP 5, 13–14 (2003) (citing to respondents’ 
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ownership plans may ensure that part of the firm’s ownership remains 
invested in the firm’s mission, even after a change of control.120 Funds 
select target investments based, in part, on company mission, and some 
funds gauge their impact by sustained company commitment to mission, 
even after fund exit. Impact funds may be especially attuned to mission-
aligning mechanisms with portfolio companies and prefer employee 
ownership as one means to pursue that end. 
Mission Lock Prediction. If funds are implementing employee 
ownership as a way of aligning mission incentives, those funds may also 
have other provisions in place to protect company mission during the 
investment and/or after the fund’s exit. For example, fund exits that are 
not mission-aligned could be prohibited in the investment contract. For 
example, a fund may be prohibited, by a mission lock term in the 
agreement, from selling its equity position in the portfolio company to a 
non-impact committed investor such as a traditional private equity fund. 
c) Direct Impact 
Impact funds may also prefer employee ownership schemes if 
promoting employee ownership is consistent with the social impact 
mission of the fund. For some impact funds, employee ownership itself 
may be a goal, especially if the fund has a stated impact goal of, for 
example, job creation or economic empowerment. Shared ownership plans 
can build financial inclusion and add social impact value by offering 
options programs to all levels of employees, though the value of such a 
program will depend on employees’ preferences and beliefs.121 
Direct Impact Prediction. If funds are implementing employee 
ownership provisions to serve the fund’s impact mission, then funds that 
state a mission for social/individual economic empowerment (rather than 
environmental benefit, for example) should be more likely to implement 
employee ownership than other types of funds. 
                                                     
attachment to mission as a prominent explanation of why individuals intended to stay with the 
organization). 
 120. This is similar to the argument in Gavis, supra note 101, at 1489. Consider, for example, 
that under the Delaware Benefit Corporation Act, only shareholders can bring derivative suits to 
enforce mission.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2013) (authorizing shareholder derivative suits to 
enforce directors’ duties to “manage or direct the business and affairs of the public benefit corporation 
in a manner that balances the pecuniary interests of the stockholders, the best interests of those 
materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and the specific public benefit or public benefits 
identified in its certificate of incorporation” consistent with § 365(a)). 
 121. See ACCION, supra note 113 (describing various methods for constructing employee 
ownership plans). 
2017] In Pursuit of Good & Gold 579 
IV. DATA POOL AND METHODOLOGY OF REVIEW 
The data described in this Article are generated from survey  
responses and documents submitted by impact investment funds as a part 
of a study administered by the Wharton Social Impact Initiative (WSII).122 
A. Wharton Social Impact Initiative Survey 
Our data come from a survey of impact funds administered by the 
WSII. WSII compiled an initial database of 437 possible impact PE funds 
via primary research and by working with organizations such as B Lab, 
the Emerging Markets Private Equity Association (EMPEA), and Anthos 
Asset Management, and referring to lists such as ImpactBase and Impact 
Assets 50. At the time of our document review, eighteen months after the 
first release of the survey, 342 fund managers were contacted and 47 had 
completed the survey, representing 64 separate funds and 656 portfolio 
companies.123 
The WSII survey covers a range of questions that can broadly be split 
into eight categories: 
(i) General fund-level questions, such as fund focus, size, vintage 
year, and whether the fund self-identifies as an impact fund; 
(ii) Fund-level impact questions, such as the nature of the fund’s 
impact mission and the rights and responsibilities of General Partners 
(GPs) with respect to the fund’s stated mission, if any. Funds also 
have the option to upload ratings from the Global Impact Investing 
Rating System (GIIRS) if applicable; 
(iii) Fund-level contract questions, such as hurdle rate and initial fund 
term. Funds also have the option to upload Private Placement 
Memoranda (PPM), Limited Partner Agreements (LPA), and side 
letters; 
(iv) Fund-level quarterly financial data, such as cash flows. Funds 
also have the option to upload audited financial documents; 
(v) General portfolio company-level questions, such as industry, 
location, and size. Funds also have the option to upload term sheets; 
                                                     
 122. Authors of this paper, Dr. Chris Geczy (Principal Investigator), Dr. David Musto (Principal 
Investigator), and Jessica Jeffers (Ph.D. Candidate) worked in conjunction with others at the Wharton 
Social Impact Initiative to design the survey study, solicit participants, and receive and track results. 
See Jacob Gray, et al., Great Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact 
Investing (Oct. 7, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2694620. 
 123. Because of the sensitive nature of the information, the WSII survey data is protected by a 
strict confidentiality agreement, and we cannot identify any of the funds discussed below. 
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(vi) Portfolio company-level impact questions, such as company 
impact focus; 
(vii) Portfolio company-level financial questions, such as capital 
invested and pre-money valuation; and finally 
(viii) Realization-level questions, such as realization type and 
whether the realization was mission-aligned. A sample of the survey 
questions reported upon in this paper is available at Appendix A 
to this Article. 
B. Document Review 
Twenty-three fund management companies, representing thirty-six 
impact investment funds, submitted documents and formed our sample. 
We reviewed 164 contractual documents reflecting organization of the 
funds and fund investment in portfolio companies. For our data discussion, 
fund-level documents mean legal documents regarding the formation of 
and investment into the fund. These documents are created for investors 
into the impact fund and include documents such as limited partnership 
agreements, operating agreements, investment agreements, and private 
placement memoranda. Portfolio company-level documents, on the other 
hand, refer to investment agreements and terms between the impact fund 
and the portfolio company in which the fund will invest. Portfolio 
company-level documents include preliminary term sheets, investment 
agreements, and subscription agreements. 
Document review responses were verified or supplemented by 
survey responses when the contents of the document review and survey 
overlapped or were complementary. 
 
Figure 1: Documents Reviewed 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017] In Pursuit of Good & Gold 581 
We frame our results discussion around four samples originating 
from survey participation. The first and largest sample captures all survey 
responses. Depending upon the survey question, we typically describe this 
sample as “all survey funds” or “all survey portfolio companies.”124 The 
second cut captures all fund-submitted documents by funds participating 
in the survey. This group is smaller than the all-survey responses simply 
because not all participating funds submitted legal documents in 
conjunction with the survey. Depending on the analysis, we often segment 
this sample into “all document review funds” or “all document review 
portfolio companies.” Our third grouping captures funds that include 
employee ownership provisions in some documents. Throughout the 
remainder of the Article, we refer to these funds as employee  
ownership-friendly or favorable funds (EO Funds) and focus our analysis 
on EO Funds or on all of the portfolio company documents of EO Funds. 
This third grouping is necessary because within the documents submitted 
by EO Funds, some, but not, all portfolio company documentation 
contains employee ownership provisions. For example, a fund may have 
submitted documents for fifteen portfolio companies, only seven of which 
include employee ownership provisions. We count this fund as an EO 
Fund, and include all portfolio companies of this EO Fund in the third 
sample. Finally, we created the fourth and smallest sample of the portfolio 
companies with employee ownership provisions in their investment 
documents, often referred to below as EO Fund responsive portfolio 
companies or EO portfolio companies. Returning to the example above, 
only the seven portfolio companies with employee ownership provisions 
are included as an EO Fund responsive portfolio company. 
1. The Employee Ownership Sample 
Twenty-three funds and fund families submitted documents for our 
review: twelve were stand-alone funds. Nine fund families have common 
managers and created two or more legally separate and distinct funds. 
Counting all participants—standalone and sub funds—thirty-six funds 
participated in the document review. 
Funds provided investment documents detailing their investment in 
portfolio companies. Our total document sample contained 100  
portfolio-level documents: 80 term sheets and 20 investment contracts 
                                                     
 124. We further analyzed survey responses by applying our next three data cuts (all document 
review, all EO funds/portfolio companies, and all EO Fund responsive portfolio companies, to the 
survey responses at both the funds and portfolio company levels. Our document review produced 
thirty-one EO Fund responsive portfolio companies. We were able to identify thirty EO portfolio 
companies in the survey responses by matching the funds, managers, and portfolio company identified 
in the survey responses; for one, we were not able to verify it sufficiently to include in the survey 
responses for EO portfolio companies. 
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such as subscription agreements, shareholder agreements, and loan 
agreements. We reviewed documents dated from 1996 to 2014, with the 
majority occurring between 2009 and 2014. 
Out of our sample, thirty-one documents (31% of portfolio 
investment documents) contained references to employee ownership 
schemes and form the basis of one of our key samples discussed in this 
Article. Figure 2 presents employee ownership-favorable documents 
spanning from 2003 to 2014, with three documents undated. 
 
Figure 2: Employee Ownership Document Timeline 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eight of the thirty-six, or 22%,125 impact investment funds 
participating in the document review included employee ownership 
provisions in their portfolio investment documents. Participating funds 
submitted between one and twenty-five documents at the fund and 
portfolio level for review, with an average of 4.6 documents per fund,126 
and more than half of participating funds submitted three or fewer 
documents. 
 
 
 
                                                     
 125. If we look at the fund family level, six funds out of twenty-three contained employee 
ownership language representing 26% of the sample. 
 126. If we look at the fund family level, the average documents submitted per fund family is 7.3, 
but that number is skewed by the three fund families that submitted more than twenty documents. 
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Table 1: EO Fund Documents 
Participating 
Fund 
Total Documents  
Submitted 
Responsive  
Documents 
Fund 1 20 12 
Fund 2 6 2 
Fund 3127 
Fund 4 
Fund 5 
10 
10 
5 
Parent Total: 25 
1 
8 
1 
Parent Total: 10 
Fund 6 4 1 
Fund 7 13 1 
Fund 8 12 5 
 
Six of the employee ownership-favorable funds are limited 
partnerships—two organized in the U.S., one in Canada, and three in the 
Cayman Islands—plus one private trust organized in India and one 
investment company organized in Luxembourg. Non-U.S. funds  
(twenty-two) dominated our all document review sample (thirty-six) so 
U.S. funds may be over-represented in our EO-friendly sample.128 The 
responding funds were largely organized as limited partnerships or the 
equivalent in the country of organization. The target size of the employee 
ownership-favorable funds ranged from $10 million to more than $200 
million, which was consistent with the distribution of fund sizes in the 
overall sample.129 
The EO Funds focused investment in targeted regions including 
India, Mexico, Asia, Latin America, and two distinct regions in the United 
States. Out of the all document review sample of funds, excluding the five 
funds with an unknown geographic focus, ten were focused in the U.S. and 
twenty-one outside of the U.S.: Africa (6), Asia (3), India (1), Mexico (1), 
and a combination130 of regions (10). 
Impact funds also define their investment strategy by the industry, 
product, benefit, or development stage of companies in which they seek to 
invest. EO Funds targeted investment in such wide-ranging foci as “small 
firms in technology, handicrafts, renewable energy and agribusiness,” 
                                                     
 127. Funds 3, 4, and 5 share a common fund manager and target similar investments under 
similar criteria. 
 128. When collapsing the information to the fund family level, eighteen out of twenty-three fund 
families are organized outside of the United States. The state of incorporation is unknown for three 
funds in the document review sample. 
 129. Note that the document review sample contained one fund size outlier with a target fund 
size of $500 million. 
 130. Combination regions included Latin America and Africa (1); Latin America, Africa & Asia 
(1); India, Asia & Latin America (3); World Bank countries (1); and OCED countries (3). 
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“essential products,” “low-carbon sector services and products,” “middle 
market” technology, finance and communications firms, and more 
generally “economic development” opportunities in targeted 
communities. 
Impact funds seek different rates of financial returns: risk-adjusted, 
market-based returns (highest) or concessionary returns seeking either 
below market (middle) or capital preservation returns (lowest). Analyzing 
survey responses provided by EO Funds, we observed that seven out of 
eight EO Funds reported “targeting competitive, market rate returns,” a 
rate of 87.5% compared to 66% and 60% of responding funds in the 
document review and all survey response samples, respectively. Our fund 
sample seeks risk-adjusted market rate returns consistent with the results 
published in a 2016 GIIN impact investing study, with 59% market  
rate-seeking funds.131 
 
Table 2: Survey Response on Targeted Financial Returns 
 EO Funds All Doc. Rev. 
Funds 
All Survey 
Responding 
Funds 
Total Responses 8 27 55 
Targeting  
Competitive, Market 
Rate Returns 
7 
(87.5%) 
18 
(66%) 
33 
(60%) 
Targeting Below  
Market, but Close to 
Market Returns 
0 5 
(18.5%) 
10 
(18.18%) 
Targeting Below  
Market, Close to  
Capital Preservation  
Returns 
1 
(12%) 
4 
(14.81%) 
10 
(18.18%) 
Not Applicable  
(Explain)132 
0 0 2 
(3.63%) 
V. EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (EO) RESULTS 
A. Portfolio Company Characteristics 
We coded and statistically analyzed fund-provided survey responses 
regarding portfolio company characteristics to gain insight on whether 
                                                     
 131. GIIN, 2016 SURVEY, supra note 10, at 40. 
 132. Participants who selected “Not Applicable” were able to provide a textual description of 
why. 
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portfolio companies drive employee ownership provisions. We analyzed 
portfolio company data regarding the number of employees and 
development status. 
On the first measure, development stage, all EO Fund portfolio 
companies and EO Fund responsive portfolio companies had a higher 
stage of self-reported development than that of all document review and 
all survey portfolio companies. None of the EO Fund portfolio companies 
and none of the EO Fund responsive portfolio companies reported being 
in the product development or beta stage. Later stage development is 
consistent with emerging norms in impact investment.133 
 
Table 3: Portfolio Company Development Stage 
  
All Survey 
Portfolio 
Co. 
All Doc. 
Rev.  
Portfolio 
Co. 
All EO- 
Funds’ 
Portfolio 
Co. 
All EO 
Portfolio 
Co. 
 
    (30)134   (278) (157) (58) 
Product  
Development 
14 7 0 0 
  5.03% 4.45% 0% 0% 
Beta 1 1 0 0 
  < 1% < 1% 0% 0% 
Deploying 
Product or 
Service 
94 67 21 11 
  33.81% 42.67% 36.20% 36.66% 
Profitable 151 78 37 19 
  54.67% 49.68% 63.79% 63.33% 
N/A 18 4 0 0 
  6.47% 2.54% 0% 0% 
 
We analyzed survey responses regarding the portfolio companies’ 
targeted industry. Within the survey sample, fund managers reported on 
the industry focus of 282 portfolio companies in ninety-five different 
industries. The distribution was broad: seventy-seven identified industries 
had two or fewer responses. Survey respondents identified nine industries 
with five or more participating portfolio companies, which are listed in 
Table 4 below. Other cross-sectional analysis with less than five 
                                                     
 133. STAGARS, supra note 12, at 23. 
 134. As discussed above, one portfolio company identified in the document review could not be 
linked back to the survey data and, thus, is excluded from the discussion of portfolio company survey 
data. 
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participating portfolio companies are marked in the table with a bracket. 
Fund managers reported on 161 portfolio companies included in the 
document review representing fifty-four industries, most of which had 
fewer than five participating companies. For all EO Fund portfolio 
companies, distribution was spread thinly across twenty-seven industries, 
with only two—healthcare and microfinance—representing five or more 
portfolio companies. Our sample of EO Fund responsive portfolio 
companies (thirty) covered eighteen industries,135 with highest 
participation in education, health care, housing, livelihood,136 and 
technology industries. 
 
Table 4: Survey Responses—Portfolio Company Industries 
 All  
Portfolio 
Co. Survey 
Responses 
(282) 
All  
Document  
Review 
Portfolio 
Co. (161) 
EO Fund 
All  
Portfolio 
Co. 
(57) 
EO Fund 
Responsive 
Portfolio 
Co. 
(30) 
Total Industries 95 54 27 18 
Agriculture 34 27 [4] [2] 
Agribusiness 9 [1] Ø Ø 
Consumer 6 5 Ø Ø 
Education 5 5 [3] [2] 
Financial 37 7 [1] [1] 
Healthcare 14 10 8 [3] 
Housing137 10 7 [3] [3] 
Livelihood [3] [3] [3] [3] 
Manufacturing 8 8 [2] Ø 
Microfinance 21 21 8 [2] 
Mobile phone 10 Ø Ø Ø 
Software 6 [4] Ø Ø 
Technology 9 9 [3] [3] 
 
Portfolio companies employed workforces sized from zero to more 
than 10,000 employees. Seventy-five percent and 79% of all survey 
responses and all portfolio companies in our document review 
                                                     
 135. Represented industries include: agriculture (2), clean water (1), education (2), energy (1), 
financial (1), government (1), health care (3), housing (3), internet (2), livelihood (3), micro/small 
loans (1), rural ban (1), specialty (1), technology (3), textile (1), and wireless (1). 
 136. One fund describes livelihood as one’s “means of support or subsistence” or the activities 
that economically support a person and his/her family. 
 137. The category “Housing” reflects two subcategories of housing in the survey, which are 
rolled up into a single industry for purposes of this table and our discussion. 
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respectively, employed between 1–249 employees. Employing between 
1–248 employees decreased to 67% for all EO Funds’ portfolio companies 
and all EO Fund responsive portfolio companies. The variance is due to 
one additional EO Fund responsive portfolio company reporting in the  
250–499 range (and therefore also included in the all EO Fund portfolio 
company grouping), a change that seems unremarkable given the small 
sample size responding to each employment category. For further 
descriptive results, see  
Table 5 below. 
 
Table 5: Survey Responses—Portfolio Company Workforce Size 
 All Survey 
Portfolio 
Co. 
(245) 
All Doc. Re-
view Portfo-
lio Co. 
(146) 
EO Funds’ 
All Portfolio 
Co. 
(58) 
All EO  
Responsive 
Portfolio 
Co. (30) 
# of  
Employees 
    
0 16 
6.53% 
8 
5.47% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1–19 56 
22.85% 
30 
20.54% 
8 
13.79% 
2 
6.66% 
20–99 80 
32.65% 
54 
36.98% 
18 
31.03% 
13 
43.33% 
100–249 48 
19.59% 
32 
21.91% 
16 
27.58% 
5 
16.66% 
249–499 15 
6.12% 
7 
4.48% 
6 
10.34% 
5 
16.66% 
500–999 12 
4.89% 
6 
4.10% 
6 
10.34% 
2 
6.66% 
1000–2499 6 
2.43% 
4 
2.73% 
3 
5.17% 
2 
6.66% 
2500–4999 3 
1.22% 
2 
1.36% 
1 
1.72% 
0 
0% 
5000–9999 3 
1.22% 
1 
< 1% 
1 
1.72% 
1 
3.33% 
10,000– 
24,999 
3 
1.22% 
2 
1.36% 
2 
3.44% 
0 
0% 
588 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:555 
B. EO Funds and Contracting 
1. Funds’ Contracting for Financial and Governance Rights 
Within our document sample, we reviewed common venture 
capital/private equity financial and governance terms,138 including the 
employee ownership terms that guide this study. 
a) Common Financing and Governance Terms in Venture  
Capital/Private Equity Contracts 
Table 7 highlights common venture capital/private equity terms 
included in portfolio company-level documents utilizing three of our four 
samples:139all document review portfolio companies, EO Funds all 
portfolio companies, and EO Fund responsive portfolio companies. 
These contract terms document financial interests and rights intended 
to protect investors’ financial stakes in the portfolio company, measures 
we later link to funds’ financial incentives to include employee ownership 
provisions. Consistent across all data samples there is a preference for 
equity investments over debt and a high occurrence of investor-protective 
exit measures such as put options, redemption rights, and tag along  
rights—all of which occurred more frequently in the EO Fund sample 
compared to the broader sample. Additional protective measures of 
investors’ equity stakes include rights of first refusals on third-party stock 
sales, and preemptive and anti-dilution rights—again with noticeable 
increases for EO Funds as shown in all of their portfolio company 
documents and, in particular, the EO Fund responsive documents. 
EO Fund documents granted higher investor governance rights 
including guaranteed seats on the portfolio company board of directors, 
step in rights, and veto/approval rights. EO Funds were also more likely 
than the rest of the sample to have documented registration rights in the 
event of an IPO, noncompetes with the company entrepreneurs, and 
enhanced information rights (both quarterly performance and audited 
annual statements). 
Impact funds were more likely than the rest of the sample to 
document preferred return140 rights —38.70% occurrence within the EO 
Fund responsive documents compared to 21% in the overall sample. 
                                                     
 138. See, e.g., Kaplan & Stomberg, 2003, supra note 8; Kaplan & Stomberg, 2004, supra note 
8; Steven N. Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence, and 
Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791 (2005). 
 139. This section relies solely on data collected from the document review and therefore excludes 
the all-survey portfolio company sample. 
 140. Preferred returns are the minimum amount of profits shared with holders of preferred 
financial rights before profits are distributed to other investors. 
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Within the sample as a whole, funds infrequently used waterfall 
compensation arrangements141 as demonstrated by low-to-no occurrences 
of carried interest, catch up periods, or management fees paid by the 
portfolio company to the investor or its affiliates. The occurrence of hurdle 
rates142 is slightly greater for the sample generally (12%) than for EO Fund 
responsive documents (9.67%). The EO Fund responsive sample was also 
slightly more likely to include a commitment fee paid by the portfolio 
company to the investor—54.83% within the EO Fund responsive sample 
compared to 50% in all documents reviewed and 42.35% in all EO Fund 
portfolio company documents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 141. A common profit allocation model in private equity funds is the distribution waterfall where 
profits are distributed first to limited partners in the amount of their original investment and second to 
limited partners to pay a preferred return (the hurdle rate). Thereafter the profits are usually split 80/20 
between limited partners and the general partner, with the 20% share to the general partner referred to 
as the carried interest or carry. TOMAS KRÜGER ANDERSEN, PRIVATE EQUITY TRANSACTIONS, 
CONTRACTS AND REGULATION 71 (2015). Some agreements also include a catch up period where 
before profits are split 80/20, the general partner will be distributed profits up to a specified percentage. 
 142. Hurdle rates are linked to preferred returns and are a part of a waterfall financial 
arrangement common to private equity, particularly to limited partnerships. The preferred returns are 
called hurdle rates because the initial return on investment must be paid to investors because the 
general partner or fund founder gets paid the carried interest that is a part of the waterfall compensation 
arrangements. All hurdle rates are preferred returns, but not all preferred returns are hurdle rates if 
they simply reflect priority financial interests outside of additional payment schemes like carried 
interest. See, e.g., ANDERSEN, supra note 141, at 71. A recent study found in a sample of traditional 
venture capital funds that venture funds draw approximately 17.75% of committed investments as fees 
rather than the typically referenced 20%, and that 40% of venture funds have hurdle rates with a 
median of 8%. Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. 
FIN. STUD. 2303, 2310–12 (2010). 
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Table 6: Investor Financial & Governance Contract Terms 
 All Doc. Rev. 
Portfolio Co.  
EO Funds All 
Portfolio Co. 
doc. 
EO Funds 
Responsive 
Portfolio Co. 
doc. 
Total Documents 100 59 31 
Equity Issued in  
Portfolio Co. 
77 
77.00% 
50 
84.75% 
29 
93.54% 
Debt Issued in  
Portfolio Co. 
21 
21.00% 
3 
5.08% 
1 
3.22% 
Call Option 12 
12.00% 
4 
6.78% 
3 
9.67% 
Put Options &  
Redemption Rights  
44 
44.00% 
29 
49.15% 
18 
58.06% 
Rights of First  
Refusal on 3rd P. Stock 
Sales  
38 
38.00% 
25 
42.37% 
18 
58.06% 
Tag Along Rights  51 
51.00% 
31 
52.54% 
23 
74.19% 
Preemptive &  
Anti-dilution Rights 
66 
66.00% 
44 
74.58% 
28 
90.32% 
Investor Guaranteed 
BOD Seat  
79 
79.00% 
50 
84.75% 
30 
96.77% 
Investor Step in Rights  20 
20.00% 
13 
22.03% 
8 
25.80% 
Investor Approval or 
Veto Rights  
79 
79.00% 
47 
79.66% 
29 
93.54% 
Commitment Fee Paid 
to Investor 
50 
50.00% 
25 
42.37% 
17 
54.83% 
Catch up Periods  0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
Hurdle Rate 12 
12.00% 
5 
8.47% 
3 
9.67% 
Carried Interest  1 
1.00% 
1 
1.69% 
0 
0.00% 
Preferred Return  21 
21.00% 
14 
23.73% 
12 
38.70% 
Registration Rights  33 
33.00% 
20 
33.90% 
12 
38.70% 
Management Fee Paid 
to Investor/Affiliate 
4 
4.00% 
4 
6.78% 
0 
0.00% 
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 All Doc. Rev. 
Portfolio Co.  
EO Funds All 
Portfolio Co. 
doc. 
EO Funds 
Responsive 
Portfolio Co. 
doc. 
Total Documents 100 59 31 
Noncompete with Co. 
Entrepreneurs 
40 
40.00% 
25 
42.37% 
18 
58.06% 
Confidential  
Agreement  
61 
61.00% 
36 
61.02% 
21 
67.74% 
Information Rights: 
Quarterly Statements  
64 
64.00% 
42 
71.19% 
28 
90.32% 
Information Rights:  
Annual Audited  
Financials  
64 
64.00% 
41 
69.49% 
28 
90.32% 
 
b) Employee Ownership (EO) Provisions 
Of the thirty-one EO Fund responsive legal documents, twenty-four 
created new employee ownership programs, four enhanced existing 
programs, and three acknowledged existing programs without modifying 
them. 
 
Figure 3: EO Terms in Documents 
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24
6 4
EO Terms 
Documents Discussing ESOPs
Sum of ESOP in Term Sheet Sum of Create new ESOP
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592 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 40:555 
All employee ownership provisions within our sample utilize an 
employee option pool; none contain stock grants or ownership programs 
as a part of a retirement benefit plan. 
Employee ownership language in the reviewed contracts varied 
significantly. The option pool grants ranged from 5% or less (6), to  
6%–10% (13), 11%–15% (7) on a post-money basis, or left the amount 
unstated and to be agreed upon with final documentation (5). Some 
contracts expressly stated the purpose of the plan as: “providing long-term 
incentives to current and future employees”143 or “to attract and incentivize 
current and future employees.”144 Three funds in eight documents 
indicated—either in language145 or the capitalization table—that the 
reserved option pool would be created out of the pre-money capitalization 
thus indicating founder share price dilution consistent with the option 
shuffle discussed above.146 Ten documents clearly established that the 
option pool would be created post-money investment, and thirteen were 
too unclear to be categorized for this Article. Of the three funds that 
documented founder dilution through the employee ownership plans, one 
was the sole EO Fund reporting below-market returns, while others 
reported seeking market returns consistent with the rest of the EO Funds. 
2. Contracting for Funds’ General Impact 
Impact investments target nonpecuniary returns, most commonly 
measured in environmental or social terms, in addition to financial gains. 
In our document review, we observed how investors and portfolio 
companies documented the commitment to and protections for these other 
gains. Overall, we observed significantly fewer contract terms regarding 
the other gains. Given the opacity of the nonpecuniary gains in the 
portfolio company-level contracts, we expanded our review to include 
fund-level documents such as limited partnership agreements and  
private placement memoranda that may better detail how the funds’ plan 
to generate the nonpecuniary gains. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
 143. Document on file with the authors. 
 144. Document on file with the authors. 
 145. “The Company will create an unallocated option pool representing 10% of the post invest-
ment fully diluted share capital of the Company for issuance to the Promoters, employees, officers and 
consultants of the Company. However, such an unallocated option pool shall be created prior to the 
investment by the Investors.” Document on file with the authors (emphasis added). 
 146. See The Option Pool Shuffle, supra note 116. 
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Table 7: Benefit Contract Terms 
 All Doc. 
Rev. 
(Port. 
Co. & 
Fund 
levels) 
All Doc. 
Rev. 
Port. Co. 
Doc. 
All EO 
Fund 
Doc. 
(Port. 
Co. & 
Fund 
levels) 
EO Fund 
All  
Portfolio 
Co. Doc. 
EO Fund 
Respon-
sive Port. 
Co. Doc. 
Total  
Documents 
Available 
164 100 80 59 31 
Social  
Metrics  
Addressed in  
Document  
29 
17.69% 
10 
10.00% 
8 
10.00% 
4 
6.70% 
1 
3.22% 
Environmental  
Commitment  
7 
4.26% 
0 
0.00% 
1 
1.25% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
Measure of 
Fund Social  
Impact  
7 
4.26% 
1 
1.00% 
2 
2.50% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
Impact  
Committee  
6 
4.26% 
1 
1.00% 
1 
1.25% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
External  
Monitoring of  
Impact 
10 
6.09% 
2 
2.00% 
2 
2.50% 
0 
0.00% 
0 
0.00% 
 
To further our understanding of fund commitment to 
nonpecuniary/impact gains, we reviewed survey responses for funds 
included in the document review sample. Two EO Funds reported having 
a GIIRS147 rating for the fund: a response rate of 25% that closely mirrors 
that of all funds included in our document review (22%). Funds reported 
on their general approach to creating social and environmental impact 
through their investments: (i) impact through improving the operations of 
the companies in which the fund invests, (ii) impact through investment in 
business models that specifically create social or environmental benefits, 
or (iii) other. Within the EO Funds, one reported focusing on improving 
portfolio company operations (compared to five in the overall sample), 
                                                     
 147. A third-party impact measurement for impact investing generated by B Analytics. For more 
information, see GIIRS Ratings, B ANALYTICS, http://b-analytics.net/giirs-ratings [https://perma.cc/ 
X59G-TY6N]. 
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and four reported focusing on business models (compared to twelve in the 
overall sample). Five funds, including two EO Funds indicated a different 
approach.148 
To further explore fund commitment to nonpecuniary/impact gains, 
we examined survey responses regarding fund-level documents that 
required, granted discretion, or were silent as to manager’s responsibility 
to consider nonpecuniary gains when making investment decisions. Six 
EO Funds disclosed that their fund-level documents (i.e., limited 
partnership agreements and PPMs) required the manager to consider 
social and/or environmental factors when making investment decisions; a 
75% response rate that exceeds the 58% of all funds included in our 
document review. One EO Fund149 and one additional fund from the 
general sample reported that the fund-level documents were silent on a 
manager’s consideration of social and/or environmental factors when 
making investment decisions. 
To explore fund commitment to mission lock, we analyzed survey 
responses regarding mission-lock at exit,150 rights of funds to exit if a 
portfolio company’s mission changes,151 and fund investment in portfolio 
companies legally structured to lock in mission.152 EO Funds’ survey 
responses indicate portfolio company exit consistent with exit rights in the 
other cross sections. Within the EO Funds, we observe low occurrence of 
mission-lock contracts, with the exception of one EO Fund reporting 
heavy reliance on mission-lock contract terms at exit. EO Funds were less 
likely than the all-survey and all-document review sample of funds to 
include investment contract terms facilitating early divestment if the 
portfolio company changed mission during the investment. EO Funds 
reported a higher occurrence of investment in portfolio companies where 
mission-lock was built into the legal structure of the portfolio company. 
Four EO Funds (57%) reported that 50% or more of its portfolio 
                                                     
 148. Other funds described their general approach as investing in companies that produce 
products and services for low-income people, purchasing farmland for sustainable farming practice 
leases, creating value for others through company investment, promoting sustainable and  
stakeholder-oriented companies, and job creation. 
 149. One EO Fund reported that fund-level documents both allowed managers to consider 
environmental factors when making investment decisions and that the fund-level documents were 
silent as to the issue. As a result, that fund’s responses are not included in the discussion above. 
 150. Funds responded to the question: “For what % of your divestments/exits has there been a 
contract with the acquirer regarding the ongoing social and environmental performance of the 
company? Choose N/A only if your fund has not had any exits.” 
 151. Funds responded to the question: “What % of the fund’s invested capital has included 
language or a covenant in the investment agreement that allows the fund to divest early if the mission 
of the investment or business model changes during the investment lifetime?” 
 152. Funds responded to the question: “What % of the total fund is invested in companies that 
have a written legal governance structure that locks in the mission, requiring consideration of its 
stakeholders (community, environment, suppliers, employees)?” 
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companies had legal structure mission-lock compared to 39% of all survey 
funds and 47% of all document review funds. 
 
Table 8: Survey Responses—Mission Lock 
For what % of your divestments/exits has there been a contract with 
the acquirer regarding the ongoing social and environmental  
performance of the company? Choose N/A only if your fund has not 
had any exits 
 
  All Survey 
Funds (33) 
All Doc. Rev. 
Funds (19) 
EO-Funds 
(7) 
N/A 
 
19 
57% 
12 
63% 
4 
57% 
0 
 
8 
25% 
4 
21% 
2 
28% 
1–24% 
 
2 
6% 
1 
5% 
0 
25–49% 
 
0 
 
0 0 
50–74% 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
75+ 
 
4 
12% 
2 
10.50% 
1 
14% 
What % of the fund’s invested capital has included language or a  
covenant in the investment agreement that allows the fund to divest 
early if the mission of the investment or business model changes  
during the investment lifetime? 
 
  All Survey 
Funds 
(33) 
All Doc. Rev. 
Funds  
(19) 
EO-Funds 
(7) 
0/blank 18 9 4 
  51% 47% 57% 
1–24% 1 1 1 
  3% 5% 14% 
25–49% 0 0 0 
  0% 0% 0% 
50–74% 1 1 0 
  3% 5% 0% 
75+ 14 8 2 
  40% 42% 28% 
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What % of the total fund is invested in companies that have a written 
legal governance structure that locks in the mission, requiring  
consideration of its stakeholders (community, environment, suppliers,  
employees)? 
 
  All Survey 
Funds (33) 
All Doc. Rev. 
Funds (19) 
EO-Funds 
(7) 
0/blank 
 
17 
45% 
10 
53% 
3 
43% 
1–24% 
 
2 
6% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
25–49% 
 
4 
11% 
2 
11% 
0 
0% 
50–74% 
 
4 
11% 
2 
11% 
1 
14% 
75+ 
 
11 
31% 
7 
37% 
3 
42% 
 
C. Portfolio Companies and Funds’ Employee-specific  
Contracting Terms 
We analyzed contract provisions relating to employees in our 
document review. In our initial review of the 164 documents, six 
documents originating from five separate funds (13.8% of our sample of 
funds) specifically addressed employee wages, safety, or 
nondiscrimination as an intended outcome of the investment fund. All 
employee-specific statements were included in fund-level documents such 
as limited partnership agreements, shareholder agreements, or private 
placement memoranda. Only one document corresponded to an EO Fund. 
Two EO funds self-reported that they specifically target or have a 
preference for investments that impact employees;153 a 25% response rate 
that mirrors that of all funds included in our document review (27.78%). 
The survey responses do not demonstrate notable trends inside or 
outside of the EO Funds and EO Fund portfolio companies. EO Funds 
reported low occurrences of employee-specific goals in portfolio 
companies and responsive portfolio companies where the numbers 
matched or were lower than the survey sample as a whole. Portfolio 
company commitment to employees and employment issues consolidated 
to the fund level adds nuance to the story. Twenty-five percent of EO 
                                                     
 153. Funds answered whether the fund explicitly targets or has a preference for investment in 
companies with social impact in employment generation (emphasis added). 
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Funds reported portfolio company commitment to income impact, 
compared with 11% in our document-review sample and 20% for the 
survey responses generally. Thirty-seven percent of EO Funds reported 
portfolio company commitment to job creation compared with 19% in our 
document-review sample, and 27% for the survey responses generally. 
 
Table 9: Survey Responses—Portfolio Company Employee,  
Income and Job Goals 
 
EO Fund  
Responsive 
Portfolio Co. 
EO Fund All 
Portfolio Co. 
Doc. 
All Doc.  
Review  
Portfolio Co. 
Doc. 
All Survey 
Portfolio Co. 
Total  
Responses 
30154 
8 funds  
reporting 
58155 
8 funds 
 reporting 
209 
36 funds  
reporting 
339 
44 funds  
reporting 
Portfolio 
Co.  
Employee 
Impact 
0 
0.00% 
 
(0 funds  
reporting) 
0 
0.00% 
 
(0 funds 
 reporting) 
19 
9.09% 
 
(1 fund  
reporting) 
65 
19.17% 
 
(6 funds  
reporting) 
Portfolio 
Co. Income 
Impact  
5 
16.66% 
 
(2 funds  
reporting) 
7 
12.06% 
 
(2 funds  
reporting) 
33 
15.78% 
 
(4 funds  
reporting) 
49 
14.45% 
 
(9 funds  
reporting) 
Portfolio 
Co. Job  
Creation  
Impact  
4 
13.33% 
 
(2 funds  
reporting) 
9 
15.51% 
 
(3 funds  
reporting) 
53 
25.35% 
 
(7 funds  
reporting) 
97 
28.61% 
 
(12 funds  
reporting) 
  
VI. HYPOTHESES, PREDICTIONS AND RESULTS DISCUSSION 
We organized our inquiry into employee ownership as expressing 
portfolio company or fund preferences; we discuss the results reported 
above consistent with that organization. 
                                                     
 154. One EO-friendly portfolio company was not identified in the survey responses. 
 155. One EO-friendly portfolio company was not identified in the survey responses. 
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A. Are Portfolio Company Preferences Driving EO Provisions? 
We did not observe common features among our portfolio 
companies—shared industrial foci, heavy reliance on employees for 
production, or a workforce size conducive to influencing company 
outcomes—which we would expect if portfolio companies drove inclusion 
of employee ownership provisions in our sample to align interests with, 
sort, or retain employees. Portfolio company characteristics within our 
small sample (thirty-one companies), however, do not explain the 
preference for employee ownership provisions. 
Portfolio Company Industry & Location. Portfolio company 
characteristics that would be expected to influence contracting norms 
include the industry and geography in which the company operates. In 
particular, industry reliance on human capital should influence the use of 
shared ownership plans for incentive-aligning purposes156 and local labor 
market conditions for their appropriateness for retention purposes.157 
Within our sample, however, we observed that the portfolio companies 
participated in diverse industries and in diverse locations. Thirty funds158 
participated in eighteen different industries, with two or more participating 
in the education, health care, housing, livelihood,159 and technology 
industries. The thin distribution across many industries was consistent 
with our sample as a whole. However, EO Fund portfolio companies, as 
compared to survey responses for all portfolio companies, underrepresent 
investments in the agriculture business and general financial services but 
overrepresent participation in technology, livelihood, and education 
industries. It is possible that the employee demands of these industries 
drive preferences for employee ownership provisions in a way not 
captured by the survey or document review. 
Portfolio Company Development Stage. In our results, we noted 
some difference between the development stage of EO Fund responsive 
portfolio companies (slightly more likely to report that they were 
deploying product/services or profitable) and the development stages of 
all companies in the document review or survey samples. None of the EO 
Fund portfolio companies reported that the company was in a product 
development or beta stage. We find these observations insufficient to form 
a compelling motivation for employee ownership preferences. We note 
that the document review and survey samples had low response rates 
                                                     
 156. Chang, supra note 96, at 180. 
 157. Kedia & Rajgopal, supra note 104, at 115–16. 
 158. Represented industries included: agriculture (2), clean water (1), education (2), energy (1),   
financial (1), government (1), health care (3), housing (3), internet (2), livelihood (3), micro/small 
loans (1), rural ban (1), specialty (1), technology (3), textile (1), and wireless (1). 
 159. See supra text accompanying note 136. 
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(under 5%) for early development stages, and a focus on later development 
stages is consistent with emerging impact investment norms.160 
Additionally, product development and beta stages conjure images of new 
product development and enterprise that may not be consistent with the 
industry-focus or business models of the relevant portfolio companies if 
they are leveraging existing products or skilled labor to a new market. 
Workforce. Our study noted some differences in portfolio company 
workforce sizes, but these differences offer weak explanations for 
company-level preferences for employee ownership. EO Funds reported 
that 67% of their portfolio companies employed between 1–249 workers 
as compared to 75% of all survey respondents. The EO Fund portfolio 
company sample contained several larger employers with five companies 
employing between 249–499 employees, two employing 500–999, two 
employing 1000–2499, and one employing 5000–9999. The lower 
concentration of workforces with less than 250 employees cuts against the 
prediction of a smaller workforce with greater ability for employee owners 
to impact outcomes that we might expect to see under the  
employee-focused hypothesis. The small size of the sample, however, 
makes the differences easily discountable due to the similar distribution 
patterns within the EO Fund portfolio companies and all survey portfolio 
companies. 
The patterns of portfolio company characteristics we observe in this 
study are not consistent with the hypothesis that portfolio companies drive 
inclusion of employee ownership provisions. Diverse companies without 
observable commonalities are unlikely to face the same employee 
challenges aligning incentives, sorting, or retaining talent. We did not 
observe common features or clustering of portfolio companies throughout 
our sample, as we would expect to see if their preferences—whether to 
align interests,161 sort,162 or retain163 employees—were driving employee 
ownership. Two documents stated employee-focused reasons for 
including the employee ownership provisions: “providing long-term 
incentives to current and future employees”164 or “to attract and incentivize 
current and future employees.”165 This suggests that some impact 
                                                     
 160. See, e.g., STAGARS, supra note 12, at 23. 
 161. Industry and location may indicate unique challenges aligning interests between employees 
and the portfolio company, as would variables such as number of employees and stage of company 
development. 
 162. Again, industry and location may indicate unique macro conditions with sorting challenges 
conducive to employee ownership provisions. 
 163. Our portfolio workforce information is incomplete, but industry and development stage may 
produce conditions conducive to retention concerns. 
 164. Document on file with authors. 
 165. Document on file with authors. 
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investment portfolio companies act consistent with the literature-based 
expectations, but we did not observe a pattern across our sample.166 
B. Are Fund Preferences Driving EO Provisions? 
Next we look to fund-level characteristics to explain the inclusion of 
employee ownership provisions. Fund organizational features alone do not 
explain the preference for employee ownership provisions. Five EO Funds 
were organized as a limited partnership (or the equivalent) in their country 
of organization but are organized in a variety of countries. The funds also 
exhibited diverse geographic focus of investments. 
We therefore turn to the hypotheses proposed in Section III(B) that 
fund preferences may promote employee ownership provisions. 
1. Financial Motivations 
We observe fund-level patterns consistent with, but inconclusive of, 
funds’ financial motivations for employee ownership. 
a) Roll Up 
Funds may be motivated to include employee ownership provisions 
as a way to protect financial investment by promoting best practices in the 
portfolio companies through aligned interests, sorting, and/or retaining 
talented employees. Including employee ownership provisions may be a 
way to protect financial investments and promote financial returns through 
strong portfolio company performance. We have no direct evidence of this 
motivation in our sample. Instead, we observed the strength of the EO 
Fund’s contract terms protecting traditional venture capital financial and 
governance rights. Within our sample overall we observed that impact 
funds were likely to include contract terms that traditionally protected 
financial interests and guaranteed governance rights to the investor. As 
compared to our sample as a whole, EO Funds consistently demonstrated 
higher occurrences of such terms including protective exit measures (put 
options, redemption rights, and tag along rights), protective equity position 
terms (rights of first refusals on third party stock sales, and preemptive and 
anti-dilution rights), and governance rights (guaranteed seats on the 
portfolio company board of directors, step in rights and veto/approval 
                                                     
 166. Admittedly, our portfolio company information is limited in its scope. Additional data 
points in the form of more survey participants providing portfolio company responses and more 
portfolio company documents submitted by funds would enhance our inquiry into portfolio company 
motivations for employee ownership. Additional workforce information such as turnover risk, 
workforce age, employment rates, education and noncompete enforceability would all shed additional 
light on the topic. Seeing no observable pattern within our sample; however, we turn to examine  
fund-level motivations for employee ownership. 
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rights). Additionally, we observed a slightly higher occurrence of 
commitment fees paid by portfolio companies to EO Funds. Bolstering the 
hypothesis that employee ownership may be one of many provisions 
intended to protect investors’ financial interests, we also observed that 
87% of EO Funds sought market-rate (rather than concessionary) returns 
compared to 60% in our sample as a whole. 
b) Discounting Through Option Shuffles 
Some examples of employee ownership contract language support 
the price discount hypothesis that EO Funds’ financial interests motivate 
employee ownership provisions. Three out of seven EO funds allocated 
options out of pre-money capitalization in one or more investment 
contracts. This supports the theory that employee provisions can be a 
means to discount the per-share price and protect the fund’s financial 
investment. We observed ten responsive documents, or roughly 30%, 
contained the discounting language. It is possible that our sample included 
a higher (or lower) rate of discounting because an additional thirteen term 
sheets (41%) contained incomplete information regarding how the option 
pool would be created. 
The strong traditional financial protections coupled with high 
occurrence of targeted market-rate returns and observable pricing discount 
through employee ownership plans suggest EO funds’ financial interests 
may motivate the inclusion of employee ownership provisions in portfolio 
company investment agreements. 
2. Impact Motivations 
The need to achieve nonpecuniary goals and balance those interests 
with financial returns may create unique preferences for employee 
ownership provisions among impact investment funds. We observe  
fund-level patterns consistent with, but inconclusive of, fund impact 
motivations for employee ownership. 
a) Neutralizing Agency Costs 
Funds may be unable to contract for their idiosyncratic preferred 
balance between financial and nonpecuniary interests and seek to strike 
the right balance through indirect contracting measures like aligning 
employee interests through ownership plans. Our study was not structured 
to directly observe this possible motivation. One can employ a model 
along the lines of Bénabou & Tirole (2016)167 to show that when 
                                                     
 167. Ronald Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and 
Multitasking, 124 J. POL. ECON. 305, 314–16 (2016). 
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employees have a higher utility for the firm’s mission than the VC does 
(even if the VC also has utility from the mission goal), this drives the VC 
to allocate a greater fraction of the company to share with employees. 
b) Mission Lock on Portfolio Company 
Our study observations offer some limited support for the mission 
lock hypothesis. Impact investment funds screen investments, in part, 
based upon portfolio company mission. Funds may want to ensure that the 
mission is served during and after investment both to protect the fund’s 
investment strategy and to achieve the fund’s nonpecuniary goals. Within 
our EO Fund sample we observed a higher occurrence of investment in 
portfolio companies structured to legally lock in the company’s mission: 
57% compared to 47% and 39% in all document review and all survey 
responses, respectively. The presence of legal structure lock may account 
for the lower EO Fund occurrences of contract rights protecting mission 
during investment or after exit. The higher incidence of legal mission lock 
supports the hypothesis that employee ownership provisions are a means 
for funds to serve nonpecuniary interests by giving mission-locked 
employees partial ownership. 
c) Measurable Fund Impact 
Our final impact hypothesis states that funds with an express mission 
to generate benefits related to employment (like income, ownership, job 
creation, etc.) should be more likely to implement employee ownership 
provisions than other types of funds. The low occurrence of observable 
social metrics in our document review generally confounded our efforts to 
support this hypothesis. We report mixed results. Only one EO Fund 
documented employee-specific outcomes in fund-level documents 
included in our review. We expanded our inquiry by reviewing fund 
survey responses. EO Funds reported that 25% specifically target 
investments that impact employees, a rate that mirrors the 27% of all funds 
included in our document review. 
On the other hand, EO Fund managers, when compared to the sample 
of funds in our document review, were more likely to report that they were 
required to consider social or environmental factors, as opposed to merely 
given discretion to consider such factors. We also found support for this 
hypothesis when analyzing portfolio company-intended impact.  
Twenty-five percent of EO Funds reported portfolio company 
commitment to income impact, compared with 11% of funds in our 
document review sample and 20% of funds in the survey responses as a 
whole. Thirty-seven percent of EO Funds reported portfolio company 
commitment to job creation compared with 19% in our document review 
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sample, and 27% for the survey responses generally. Thus, EO funds 
tended to be more focused on income impact through their portfolio 
companies. This is consistent with arguments that EO plans are a way to 
address social inequality.168 
C. Framing Observations, Implications and Next Steps 
Our results as presented in this Article are limited in the following 
respects. First, our sample size was relatively small. Second, our 
instruments—both the survey and the document review—were 
constructed based upon established contracting norms in private equity 
and venture capital. This instrument may be too blunt to capture the full 
scale of nuance of these contracts, omit emerging norms unique to this 
space, or seek to measure a field that is too new to have norms around 
which contracts can coalesce. Second, with regard to the “impact” 
investment terms, these may be more opaque in the contracting process 
due to a variety of reasons. Opacity of impact terms may reflect the 
nascence of the field and the lack of standardization; lack of sophistication 
with portfolio companies; greenwashing by funds; difficulty of creating 
contract terms/benchmarks around individualized measures and  
context-dependent outcomes; the negotiation phase (term sheets, not final 
agreements), etc. To this last point, we think our study is particularly 
relevant to informing the contracting norms and related literature. Third, 
our document review relied heavily upon term sheets, which only cover 
high level deal terms and provide neither a complete nor a thorough 
description of the final contractual agreement. Thus, the sample of EO 
Fund responsive documents may underrepresent the total number of 
employee ownership provisions and other relevant contract terms analyzed 
in this study in the final agreements. Finally, for survey responses, the 
funds self-reported for themselves and on behalf of the portfolio 
companies—a process which can be subject to bias and errors.169 
Acknowledging these caveats, we believe that this is a pioneering 
review of contract terms in the impact investment space. Through this 
study we gained unparalleled access to private agreements and a rare 
window under the hood of an emerging investment product largely 
shielded from public view. We report our findings with the aim of 
identifying contract norms and motivations for private ordering solutions 
                                                     
 168. Strom, supra note 4; Ittner, supra note 102, at 92; see also Hand, supra note 102, at 398; 
Gavis, supra note 101, at 1486 (“[I]t is apparent that Congress established leveraged ESOPs in order 
to address perceived inequities in the distribution of capital throughout the economy.”). 
 169. See, e.g., Stewart Donaldson & Elisa J. Grant-Vallone, Understanding Self-Report Bias in 
Organizational Behavior Research, 17 J. BUS. & PSYCH. 245, 247 (2002) (describing self-reporting 
bias, particularly in the business setting). 
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documented in our study and with the hope of beginning a concrete 
discussion of practices in the impact investing space.170 
CONCLUSION 
We reviewed a unique sample of contracts pertaining to private 
equity impact funds and their portfolio companies. We observed EO 
funds’ consistent utilization of traditional private equity and VC 
contracting terms to protect their financial interests in portfolio companies 
through strong governance, exit, anti-dilution, and financial rights. 
Contracting norms regarding nonpecuniary interests were harder to 
observe with the methods employed in our study, and will be the subject 
of future work in the space. 
The clustering of employee ownership provisions within some 
impact funds, but not others, formed our main inquiry in this Article. 
Employee ownership plans emerged as a recurring condition for joint 
agreements between impact funds and portfolio companies. Given the 
unique context of impact investment’s dual goals, we wanted to explore 
the role of employee ownership in this type of private contracting. We 
began by reviewing existing theories for why companies may wish to 
implement these shared ownership plans. We then proposed a new set of 
hypotheses for why funds might request employee ownership plans, 
relating to both financial and impact goals. 
Our document review did not yield any striking patterns among EO 
responsive portfolio companies or portfolio companies invested in by EO 
Funds, in terms of their location, development stage, industrial focus, and 
size. This supports company-level theories of EO plans. The lack of 
clustering of these companies around common characteristics suggests 
that fund-level considerations may have been drivers of EO inclusion in 
our sample. 
Fund-level patterns provided some limited support for new theories 
of EO plans, although the size of the sample prevents any definitive 
conclusions. As compared to our sample as a whole, EO Funds 
consistently demonstrated higher occurrences of such terms including 
protective exit measures, protective equity position terms, and governance 
rights, and were more likely to seek market-rate returns, suggesting that 
fund-level financial considerations may have played a role. 
                                                     
 170. In future research generated from this same set of impact investment documents, we hope 
to explore more broadly contracting norms in impact investment. We are particularly interested in 
provisions related to social and environmental benefit contracting and in documenting the ways in 
which impact investment documents conform to or deviate from contracting norms in traditional 
private equity and venture capital agreements. 
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Additionally, the structure of some of the employee ownership plans 
was consistent with dilution of the entrepreneur, bolstering the idea that 
EO Funds acted in a financially savvy fashion. 
There was also evidence of less cynical motives for employee 
ownership plans. In particular, contractually binding mission lock was 
more common among EO Funds, raising the possibility that impact funds 
see employee ownership plans as another way to lock in mission. Another 
remarkable pattern was the higher incidence of income and job-creation 
focus among EO Fund portfolio companies, along with survey responses 
that EO Fund managers were required to consider social or environmental 
factors. EO Fund managers may see employee ownership plans as a tool 
to fulfill their impact goals directly. That being said, we note that only one 
EO Fund documented employee-specific outcomes in fund-level 
documents, and EO Funds were no more likely to specifically target 
investments that impact employees than the overall sample. 
Our results do not eschew portfolio company motivations for 
employee ownership plans. Companies may want them to align, sort, and 
retain employees. In the unique context of impact investments where 
investors and portfolio companies are balancing financial and 
nonpecuniary interests, we did not observe portfolio company patterns 
that, alone, explain the inclusion of these provisions. Employee ownership 
provisions were not randomly strewn throughout our document review but 
were clustered within several funds, suggesting that fund-level 
motivations might explain or contribute to the motivations for employee 
ownership provisions. In the expanded matrix of motivations at play—
financial and benefit for both investor and company—we observed 
patterns that suggest fund-level motivations for employee ownership 
provisions serving financial and impact goals. 
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APPENDIX A: SELECTED SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
Survey Variable 33: Whether the fund has GIIRS rating data and is 
willing to share it with the WSII? 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes 
 No 
 
Survey Variable 36: The statement that best describes the fund's 
financial return goals: 
Answer option(s): 
 Targeting competitive, market rate returns 
 Targeting below market, but close to market returns 
 Targeting below market, close to capital preservation returns 
 Not Applicable (Explain) 
 
Survey Variable 37: Text explanation of a 'Not Applicable' response. 
Answer option(s): text 
 
Survey Variable 39: The statement that best describes the fund's 
approach to creating social and environmental impact. 
Answer option(s): 
 We aim to create social or environmental impact by improving 
the operations of the companies in which we invest. 
 We invest in business models that specifically create positive 
social or environmental impact. 
 Neither of the above (Explain) 
 
Survey Variable 40: Text explanation of a 'Neither' response. 
Answer option(s): text 
 
Survey Variable 41: Whether the fund's Private Placement 
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other 
comparable investment agreements include specific language that 
“Requires fund manager to consider social and/or environmental 
practices when making investment decisions”: 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
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Survey Variable 42: Whether the fund's Private Placement 
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other 
comparable investment agreements include specific language that 
“Explicitly allows the fund manager to consider social practices 
when making investment decisions”: 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
 
Survey Variable 43: Whether the fund's Private Placement 
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other 
comparable investment agreements include specific language that 
“Explicitly allows the fund manager to consider environmental 
practices when making investment decisions”: 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
 
Survey Variable 44: Whether the fund's Private Placement 
Memorandum, side letter, Limited Partner Agreement, or other 
comparable investment agreements include specific language that 
“Does not reference social and/or environmental issues”: 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
 
Survey Variable 112: What % of the fund's invested capital has 
included language or a covenant in the investment agreement that 
allows the fund to divest early if the mission of the investment or 
business model changes during the investment lifetime? 
Answer option(s): 
 0 
 1–24% 
 25–49% 
 50–74% 
 75%+ 
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Survey Variable 113: What % of the total fund is invested in 
companies that have a written legal governance structure that locks 
in the mission, requiring consideration of its stakeholders 
(community, environment, suppliers, employees)? 
Answer option(s): 
 0 
 1–24% 
 25–49% 
 50–74% 
 75%+ 
 
Survey Variable 115: For what % of your divestments/exits has 
there been a contract with the acquirer regarding the ongoing social 
and environmental performance of the company? Choose N/A only if 
your fund has not had any exits. 
Answer option(s): 
 N/A 
 1–24% 
 25–49% 
 50–74% 
 75%+ 
 
Survey Variable 166: The industry of the Company 
Answer option(s): text 
 
Survey Variable 167: The number of full-time employees of the 
company: 
Answer option(s): 
 0 
 1–19 
 20–99 
 100–249 
 250–499 
 500–999 
 1000–2499 
 2500–4999 
 5000–9999 
 10,000–24,999 
 25,000–49,000 
 50,000–99,999 
 100,000+ 
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Survey Variable 168: Which of the following best reflects the 
development status that company has attained? 
Answer option(s): 
 Product Development 
 Beta 
 Deploying Product/Service 
 Profitable 
 Not applicable (Explain) 
 
Survey Variable 182: Describe the social impact focus of the 
company: Employment generation 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
 
Survey Variable 188: Describe the social impact focus of the 
company: Income/productivity growth 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
 
Survey Variable 189: Describe the social impact focus of the 
company: Job creation 
Answer option(s): 
 Yes  
 No 
 
